

Governmental Affairs

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The President's Strategy for Survival

Richard Nixon is rapidly running out of options in his struggle to survive Watergate. Last week he exercised a fresh one. Pushing his Special Counsel James St. Clair out front in a political as well as a legal role, Nixon embarked on a drive to save himself by appealing directly to the public and assailing the tactics of the House Judiciary Committee, which is investigating his conduct in office. It was much too early to assess public reaction, but the impact on the House of Representatives was immediate. The tactic backfired, and impeachment sentiment rose.

As both the President and St. Clair, a shrewd and highly successful Boston trial lawyer, moved boldly into the public arena, the outlines of the three-pronged White House offensive were sharply etched. The strategy seeks to:

1) Goad the House Judiciary Committee into hastily subpoenaing presidential tapes and documents and basing its entire impeachment case on a contempt of Congress citation against Nixon for obstructing the impeachment inquiry if, as he has so far, he refuses to yield the evidence. Nixon apparently believes that such a charge would be too thin to enlist broad public support and that even if impeached by the House on that charge, he could muster the 34 votes necessary in a Senate trial to retain his office.

2) Delay any broader impeachment move by stalling in the delivery of requested evidence, continuing to raise legal technicalities, and resorting to time-consuming court action. Delay could erode public interest in the whole sordid scandal. Stalling could also push the crucial impeachment vote closer to the November elections—thus making it more risky for any incumbent Congressman—and perhaps even cause the problem to be carried over into the next session of Congress.

3) Solidify the President's hard-core support and play on the more general public fear of forcibly removing any President from office. This is being done through a public relations campaign designed to highlight the President's achievements in office and the sanctity of the presidency itself. At the same time the effort seeks to obfuscate and obscure Nixon's own Watergate role and portray impeachment as a partisan movement spearheaded by political enemies. At a minimum, the aim is to build enough pressure on normally friendly Senators to prevent conviction on any House-approved impeachment charge.

Most of this strategy was probably devised by Nixon himself, but it has both come together and reached its peak since St. Clair became his chief legal strategist early in January. Not only is Nixon being scrutinized by the Judiciary Committee but, more important, he is on trial in the court of public opinion. At long last he has a lawyer who—unlike his previous counsel—is a seasoned courtroom attorney. Moreover, St. Clair's Washington experience (see box page 12) goes back to the classic Army-McCarthy hearings of 1954, when he was an assistant to Joseph N. Welch,

the Army's counsel. A poised and suave performer, he has brought an aura of aggressive confidence to Nixon's defense campaign. "Jim has been a bonanza for us," observes Alexander Haig, Nixon's overworked chief of staff. Haig describes St. Clair as a man who has "considerable acumen" in the highly charged and shifting political atmosphere of Watergate. "He intuitively understands the needs of the President."

Last week the President carried his public relations drive both North and South. In Nashville, he helped open the \$15 million home of the Grand Ole Opry. As 4,400 country music fans applauded, Nixon said that their kind of music "radiates the love of this nation—patriotism." He flubbed an attempt at spinning a Yo-Yo given him by Country Music Star Roy Acuff and played *God Bless America* and *Happy Birthday* on the piano to honor his wife Pat, just back from South America, on her 62nd birthday. In a relaxed evening, there was no talk of his Watergate agony.

The President was garrulous and high-spirited the day before on a visit to Chicago, where he made his first public appearance outside Washington or the South since July, 1973. He easily handled soft questions from a largely friendly gathering of some 2,000 members and guests of the Executives' Club of Chicago. He implied that he will not comply with the Judiciary Committee's request for White House tapes and documents beyond those already turned over to Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski. With much exaggeration, Nixon complained that the committee wanted "all of the tapes of every presidential conversation—a fishing license or a complete right to go through all of the presidential files." He said that "it isn't the question that the President has something to hide." But to let anyone "just come in and paw through the documents," he contended, would destroy "the principle of confidentiality" between a President and his advisers.

Nixon was even more forceful in vowing once again that he would not resign. "Resignation is an easy cop-out," he declared, adopting his frequent rhetorical device of posing an artificially easy-or-tough choice. "But resignation of this President on charges of which he is not guilty simply because he happened to be low in the polls would forever change our form of government. It would lead to weak and unstable presidencies in the future, and I will not be a party to the destruction of the presidency of the United States."

Third Version. Only when he discussed a detail of his own Watergate role did Nixon's confidence seem to ebb. His voice grew tremulous as he described his increasingly crucial conversation with John Dean, his former counsel, on March 21, 1973. In a statement last Aug. 15, Nixon said Dean had told him that secret payments had been made to the original Watergate defendants only to meet their legal costs. On March 6 of this year, however, Nixon said flatly in a press conference that Dean had told him on March 21 that the cash was

meant to buy the silence of the lowly burglars—which Nixon admitted was a criminal act. After a week of silence on the topic, Nixon made an attempt to bridge that direct conflict and it was a lame one. Dean, he said, had just "alleged" that the money was used to keep the men quiet. This third Nixon version of the conversation was meant to clear him of any charge that he had known of a crime and done nothing about it.

The main question of the impeachment inquiry, of course, is whether Nixon not only knew of such acts but participated in them as part of a conspiracy to conceal the origins of the June 17, 1972 wiretapping and burglary of Democratic national headquarters. An event that could illuminate that fateful matter—and possibly blunt the entire Nixon counterattack—was scheduled to take place this week in the Washington courtroom of Federal Judge John J. Sirica. He was to rule that a Watergate grand jury report and a briefcase full of evidence relating to Nixon's own role in that conspiracy will be given to the House Judiciary Committee, headed by New Jersey Democrat Peter Rodino.

Factual Findings. The grand jury package, given to Judge Sirica on March 1, when the jurors also indicted seven of Nixon's former official and political associates in the cover-up conspiracy, does not draw conclusions as to whether Nixon acted illegally. But a summary of the evidence in the briefcase lists a series of factual findings by the grand jury that do implicate Nixon in the wrongdoing of his aides. Any such transmission of the evidence to the House by Sirica is likely to be appealed. John J. Wilson, the attorney representing two of the indicted conspirators, H.R. Haldeman and John Ehrlichman, has vowed to appeal.

The delicate way in which the White House has been handling the grand jury report shows the deft touch of St. Clair. He surprised many Washington lawyers by raising no objection at all to the idea of Sirica's sending the report to the Rodino committee when the judge held an extraordinary hearing on the question on March 6. To oppose this move would make it appear that the President feared a revealing of the contents of the briefcase. But St. Clair well knew that Wilson, whose clients' interests in many respects dovetail with those of Nixon, would fight to squelch the grand jury's findings. Wilson promptly raised objections on the grounds that 1) the grand jury had no power to make such a report, and 2) the documents were likely to mention Haldeman and Ehrlichman, and any public disclosure could prejudice their chances for a fair trial.

While Wilson carries on the legal battle over the grand jury report, the President and his staff are expected to continue their public psychological warfare against Watergate. That attack last week was well orchestrated. First, Ken Clawson, the White House director of communications, leaked to reporters a Feb. 25 letter from John Doar, chief counsel for the Rodino committee, to St.

Clair. It showed that Doar was seeking not only six additional Nixon tapes, as generally believed—even by members of the committee—but also tapes covering six periods of time, from February to April 1973. Presidential Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler said that this involved 42 tapes. The White House disclosure made the Doar request look excessive, though it by no means supported St. Clair's claim that the committee seemed to want "hundreds of thousands of documents and thousands of hours of recorded conversations."

The main aim of those White House revelations, however, seemed to be to try to drive a wedge between the Rodino committee's members and its staff, including Doar and the Republican counsel Albert Jenner. In an effort to prevent news leaks—as urgently demanded by the White House—Doar and Jenner had been keeping only the committee leaders, Rodino and ranking Republican Edward Hutchinson, posted on all details of their dealings with St. Clair. Clawson charged that Doar had tried to "hoodwink" the committee by keeping from the other members the extent of his request.

Press Secretary Ziegler also assailed the Doar request. "The mere fact of an impeachment inquiry does not give Congress the right to back up a truck and haul off White House files," he told newsmen. Moreover, Ziegler said that for Nixon to comply with another Doar request—that the committee staff be given access to the White House files of such former Nixon aides as Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Dean and Charles Colson—would be "constitutionally irresponsible." Presidential Counsellor Bryce Harlow later protested to reporters that the Rodino committee members were acting like "children who are asking for another helping before they have eaten what's on their plate."

The surprise in the White House campaign was St. Clair's sudden emergence in public and his accessibility to reporters. Until recently, he had been operating mainly in private. He had bargained skillfully and sternly with Special Prosecutor Jaworski over which White House tapes and documents the grand jury could be given. St. Clair had spoken out publicly on only a few occasions. On Feb. 4 he attacked the credibility of John Dean and criticized Jaworski for publicly defending Dean's veracity. As a result, Jaworski privately scolded St. Clair for "unprofessional conduct," and their cordial but correct relationship cooled.

Legal Views. In his major courtroom appearance in Nixon's behalf, St. Clair on Jan. 16 tried to shake the testimony of a panel of court-appointed acoustics and recording experts in a hearing before Sirica. The panel claimed that an 18½-minute erasure in one key Nixon tape in all likelihood had been deliberate rather than accidental. Though St. Clair, with his assured courtroom manner, was far more effective than such predecessors as the docile Fred Buzhardt and the ill-at-ease Leonard Garment, he made little headway against the experts. Sirica found St. Clair's questions repetitive and tedious and finally cut him off.

In last week's flurry of activity, St. Clair expressed highly controversial legal views in two television interviews

and several talks with reporters. He said that because Nixon was the nation's "chief law enforcement officer," he had not committed any crime in failing to report the hush-money payments. This was an effort to account for the fact that Nixon, by his own explanation early this month, had not reported Dean's hush-money confession (made at the March 21, 1973 meeting) to any law-enforcement agency or court.

St. Clair also said that the charge in the indictment that a payment of hush money had been made on March 21 was doubtful. His reason: "sworn testimony" at the Senate Watergate hearings included no similar charge. He further contended that Dean could no longer be used as a credible prosecution witness because a tape showed that a conversation with Nixon that Dean thought took place on March 13, 1973, actually occurred on March 21.

More broadly, St. Clair argued that the Rodino committee must determine just what kinds of presidential acts it considers impeachable before it seeks more evidence. He also claimed that he was not actually engaged in defending Richard Nixon, but in representing "the office of the presidency."

None of those statements could withstand sharp legal scrutiny. Their shrewd purpose, however, seemed to be multiple-edged. They served to challenge and fuzz up the indictment's strong implication that, at the least, Nixon had learned from Dean on March 21 of the illegal payoffs to defendants and had failed to cut them off. St. Clair's remarks sought to set the Rodino committee members off on a potentially divisive squabble over defining impeachable acts—a point on which St. Clair knows the Congressmen hold sharp differences. St. Clair was trying to strengthen Nixon's oft-repeated claim that the institution of his office, rather than his personal fate, was the overriding issue in the impeachment controversy.

The new White House offensive was backfiring in its attempt to trigger precipitate and self-defeating action by the Judiciary Committee to impeach the President solely on grounds of contempt of Congress. Committee members were angry—not at each other or at their staff—but at what they considered the obviousness of the Nixon-St. Clair tactics. While they respect St. Clair's legal savvy, they think that he has ventured into essentially political maneuverings. At that game, they assume, they are far more adept and experienced than he.

Cooling Hotheads. A few of the more volatile members of the committee almost jumped at St. Clair's bait. Such liberal Democrats as Father Robert Drinan of Massachusetts, California's Jerome Waldie and Michigan's John Conyers Jr. wanted immediately to issue subpoenas for every bit of evidence that Doar was seeking. But Chairman Rodino called a caucus of the committee's Democrats and urged the hotheads to cool off. There would be plenty of time to issue subpoenas, he argued, once the White House intention to cut off all further evidence was totally clear. Meanwhile, the committee staff was awaiting a chance to examine all of the material that St. Clair and Nixon had promised, including the 19 tapes and more than 700 documents given to the special prosecutor's office.

The White House attack seemed to

unify the committee—against the President. "It is not the White House's job to tell the committee how to discharge its constitutional function," declared Maryland Republican Lawrence J. Hogan, until now one of Nixon's strong defenders on the committee. "The President's lawyer was off base when he stated the committee should first define an impeachable offense—there is no set definition. Each member will have to subjectively determine this in his own mind." Hogan contended that Nixon was getting "bum advice" and was in danger of losing those on the committee "who are trying to keep an open mind on impeachment." The release of the Doar letter to St. Clair, protested Texas Democrat Jack Brooks, was "an affront to the comity between the White House and the Congress." But he urged his colleagues on the committee not to let "the White House hucksterism detract from the decency and forbearance of the committee. It is clear that the White House is not going to cooperate."

Rebutting St. Clair's demand that the committee state its charges against Nixon before it seeks more evidence, Republican Edward Hutchinson argued: "There are no charges. We hope we will find none. We are simply making an inquiry." Added Hutchinson: "What we have asked for is very reasonable and very relevant." The committee request, he explained, was aimed primarily at clarifying the "suspicion about the President's action in the so-called Watergate cover-up."

Contempt Citation. The committee strategy is to continue to move warily, maneuvering to avoid any court battles. Not only are such battles time consuming, but the committee is convinced that no court has any jurisdiction over any part of the impeachment inquiry and process. Impeachment is sanctioned by the Constitution as solely a congressional activity. The committee leaders expect to give St. Clair perhaps two more weeks in which to respond conclusively to its request for evidence. If he fails to do so, the request will be renewed. If Nixon and St. Clair still refuse to comply, only then will the committee issue a subpoena for the material.

Meanwhile, the committee's investigation will continue. First, all of the evidence given to Jaworski by the White House will be examined. Then the committee intends to study the package of evidence from the Watergate grand jury. If St. Clair and Nixon decide to resist the subpoena, the committee will probably seek a contempt citation against the President. The citation would become one of several—or perhaps many—points in an impeachment charge. "I would make it the last article of impeachment, not the first," declares a Republican member of the Judiciary Committee.

Reports TIME's veteran congressional correspondent, Neil MacNeil: "St. Clair's strategy is offending the House's sense of itself—an extremely dangerous business for Nixon. He is losing Southern Democrats and conservative Republicans by the dozens right now." And this is even before any of the potential impeachment evidence has been analyzed by the Rodino committee.

Always Smile. Despite St. Clair's problems, many legal scholars give him high marks so far for making the best

of what they see as a very difficult case. Under St. Clair, observes Harvard Law Professor Alan Dershowitz, "the quality of legal representation has gone way up." St. Clair is following a predictable pattern of impeachment defense, says Law Professor Arval Morris of the University of Washington. "The first thing is to narrow the concept of the impeachable offense—that rules out a whole lot of evidence." The University of Chicago's Philip Kurland views St. Clair's defense strategy as "to give only what he is forced to give and to delay as long as he can."

Richard Donahue, a leading trial lawyer in Massachusetts, offers a more invidious assessment. He considers St. Clair's tactics much the same kind of defense that one would put up for "a drunken driver. If you have a guilty client, you make 'em prove everything every inch of the way, attack everyone in the room—the judge, the court officers, the witnesses—but you always smile." Harvard's Dershowitz says that it is difficult to rate St. Clair's overall effectiveness without knowing the culpability of his client. "If Nixon is innocent, has nothing to hide, then St. Clair is doing a terrible job because he is making it appear as though Nixon has something to hide. If he is guilty, then St. Clair is doing a great job."

A strategy of delay, however, is a disservice to the nation, argues Law Professor John Flynn of the University of Utah. He objects to St. Clair's "defending this case on a petty criminal basis—raising every technical objection possible. This is a form of legal brinkmanship. He may be winning the legal battle but losing the more important battle of public confidence in the President." The University of Chicago's Harry Kalven Jr. agrees: "Delay has consequences for the whole country. It seems seriously inappropriate." It is also, of course, the opposite of what Nixon is arguing for: "I want a prompt and just resolution of this matter."

Many of St. Clair's recent statements on more specific Watergate issues are severely criticized by legal experts and other persons who have detailed knowledge of the various investigations of the scandal. Generally stated, these assertions by St. Clair include:

A President can be impeached only for crimes of a very serious nature committed in his governmental capacity.

As a practical—but not legal—matter, a serious criminal act by a President may have to be shown to enlist the two-thirds Senate vote for conviction and removal from office. Despite the views of Nixon and St. Clair, however, almost no reputable scholar contends that the "high crimes and misdemeanors" cited in the Constitution as bases for impeachment were meant to be taken in the modern sense of those words. Chicago's Kurland says that any "breach of trust of high office" falls within the meaning intended by the constitutional framers. This was shown by one of the framers of the impeachment provision, James Wilson, who said that what he had in mind was misbehavior, or what he called "malversation." James Madison added that impeachment was a protection against the "negligence or perfidy of the Chief Magistrate."

The President can claim Executive

privilege in withholding requested evidence from the House Committee.

Disputing that, the University of Washington's Morris echoes the prevailing view among constitutional scholars: "In constitutional law, there really isn't any sort of Executive privilege that the President can raise against the House." The impeachment procedure was set up to cover a unique situation in which the separation of powers among the branches of Government can be breached by the Congress to determine whether an impeachable offense has occurred. Four U.S. Presidents—Andrew Jackson, James Polk, James Buchanan and Ulysses S. Grant—have declared that they would have no right to withhold anything from an impeachment proceeding.

The House Judiciary Committee must determine what an impeachable offense is before it seeks the evidence.

There is no legal requirement to do so. It is precisely because the Constitution is vague on what is impeachable that the committee wants to determine whether there has been wrongdoing before deciding whether what it finds is impeachable. Certainly, the multiple indictments and guilty pleas on criminal charges by 26 Nixon agents so far are reason enough to prompt a broad and deep inquiry into the President's conduct in office. To carry out that inquiry properly the committee needs all the evidence it can get about the President's conduct in the Watergate and related political-espionage and payoff scandals.

Because the President is the chief law-enforcement official in the nation, he did not have a legal obligation to report his knowledge of the hush-money payments—a crime—to anyone else. He must only see to it that the judicial process was initiated.

"The President is not engaged in the law-enforcement business," contends Chicago's Kurland. "It is a title that St. Clair has created for the situation." Adds Hofstra University Law Dean Monroe Freedman: "The contention is cute, but technically it's absurd." For a President merely to tell himself that a crime has been committed is not enough, many scholars point out. People in the White House are "no different from any other citizens" when they learn of a crime, says Attorney General William Saxbe, who has a greater right than the President to consider himself the top law-enforcement official. Far from initiating judicial action in the Watergate cover-up, moreover, Nixon sought to block full disclosure. He withheld tapes and other evidence from investigators, fought vainly in the courts to keep this material away from the grand jury, and fired Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox when he persisted in seeking it.

St. Clair is not representing the President. He is representing the institution of the presidency.

"This is at best superficial and at worst misleading," declares Norman Dorsen, law professor at New York University. "It is not the presidency that is being investigated and that is denying Congress information. It is Mr. Nixon who is under investigation, who is not cooperating. It is not some abstraction that is advising St. Clair on the case. It is Richard Nixon." No one is counsel for the office of the presidency, asserts Kurland. "There is no such job. This is just rhetoric."

St. Clair seemed to concede as much

last week when he told TIME Correspondent Dean Fischer: "My client happens to be the President of the United States. In this sense, he's a unique client. There are certain decisions that only he can make. These decisions relate to the confidentiality of presidential communications and Executive privilege. I can't make those decisions for him. They're his and his alone."

Such a decision by Nixon was made when the President ruled that he would not give Jaworski any more White House evidence, including 27 tapes that the special prosecutor is still seeking. St. Clair has not heard those recordings. That puts him in a weak position in having rejected Jaworski's request on grounds that the contents of the recordings did not justify violating the President's right to protect their confidentiality. St. Clair has apparently not heard the 42 tapes sought by the Rodino staff either.

For an experienced trial lawyer, St. Clair has made some specific comments on aspects of the Watergate cover-up case that appear odd. Particularly baffling was his claim that John Dean would no longer be a witness in Special Prosecutor Jaworski's conspiracy case against Nixon's former aides. Both Nixon and St. Clair were heavily depending on the claim that Dean had been discredited because he testified before the Senate Watergate committee that he had talked to Nixon about the hush-money payments on March 13, while a tape of the conversation shows that it occurred on March 21. Dean, who had testified without access to his White House files, later told investigators that he had been wrong by one week. Nixon in Chicago seemed to be grasping at a straw in citing that one-week error as significant. Dean will be a major trial witness.

St. Clair also tried to undermine a key claim in the grand jury's conspiracy indictment: that \$75,000 in hush money had been paid on March 21, 1973, to William Bittman, the attorney for E. Howard Hunt, a Watergate wire-tapper. Hunt had been demanding money from the White House, threatening to disclose some of his seamy work as a member of Nixon's squad of secret plumber investigators. The payment was alleged by the grand jury to have been made just a few hours after Dean and Haldeman had met with Nixon on that day. St. Clair pointed out, however, that a large chart used in the Senate Watergate hearings had listed no such payment on March 21. That was hardly a conclusive refutation.

Hush Money. Testimony at the Senate hearings was imprecise as to the time of this payment. But St. Clair had to be aware that the grand jury had strong evidence of the date before citing it as a culminating act in the chain of criminal conspiracy. Last week the Washington Post reported that Frederick LaRue, a former official of Nixon's re-election committee who has pleaded guilty to conspiracy to obstruct justice, had recalled handling the payment after dinner on March 21. The date was verified by the travel records of one of LaRue's out-of-town friends, who attended the dinner. Investigators have the credit-card records of his hotel and travel expenses. That is minimal documentation; the prosecutor has other evidence too.

The payment date challenges Nix-

on's repeated claim that, during the celebrated March 21 meeting with Dean and Haldeman in his office, he flatly rejected the idea of paying any hush money. The grand jury, which heard the tape of the meeting, cited Haldeman for perjury because of his testimony at the Senate hearings that Nixon had said such payments were wrong. This grand jury action suggested that Nixon must have been lying in his public claims that he told his aides the payments were wrong. If a payment was made after the talk, the President either did not discourage the payment of hush money, or he was misunderstood by his aides, or he was disobeyed.

Nixon conceded in a press conference two weeks ago that other persons who heard the tape might "reach different interpretations. But I know what I meant, and I know also what I did. I meant that the whole transaction was wrong, the transaction for the purpose of keeping this whole matter covered up." Nixon said that he told Dean, "It is wrong, that's for sure"—and that the remark was meant to apply to both the promise of Executive clemency and the payment of hush money to any defendant.

The President has refused to release the tape or a transcript of the conversation, but TIME has learned its gist. Four important words spoken by the President come through clearly: "It would be wrong." But these words are spoken only within the context of a discussion about promising clemency. The subject of paying money to keep the burglars quiet comes once before the clemency discussion and two times after it. On none of those three occasions does Nixon say or suggest that such payments would be wrong.

Among the tapes most eagerly sought by both Prosecutor Jaworski and

the Rodino committee staff are those of conversations between Nixon and his top aides from about ten days before to ten days after this March 21 conversation. The investigators wonder whether there was any more talk of the illegal hush payments in this period. Nixon has refused to yield any of these tapes to either of the investigating bodies.

Two Supporters. An additional problem for the President is that any White House attempt to stonewall the Rodino committee by denying access to any further evidence runs the risk of alienating two of Nixon's most helpful supporters: Vice President Gerald Ford and Republican Senate Leader Hugh Scott. Ford seems to be opening a greater distance between himself and the President. He still backs the White House view that Rodino is off on a "fishing expedition" for evidence and ought to specify "a bill of particulars" against Nixon before seeking the supporting documents. But Ford irked Nixon's staff by declaring publicly that Rodino is fully entitled to see the grand jury's special report and evidence. He also said that he was "concerned" about Nixon's failure to report the illegal payment of silence money to Watergate defendants as soon as Dean told him about it. "I think I would have," Ford said.

Scott is getting nervous because he went out on a limb to assail Dean's credibility on the basis of tape transcripts and summaries shown to him by Nixon. The failure of the White House to make the same information public disturbs Scott. His associates worry that he may have been misled by the one-week discrepancy in Dean's testimony about hush money, perhaps having seen a transcript in which no such discussion appeared. As for giving the Rodino committee what it wants, Scott, too, is opposed to "fishing expeditions," but he

does not believe that the committee is on one. Noting White House objections to anyone backing a truck up to the White House for files, Scott suggests: "How about a station wagon?"

As the President's difficulties continue to accumulate, his public appearances look increasingly like an effort to go over the heads of the aroused impeachers in the House and directly to the public. His vows to "fight like hell" and "not walk away from this job" may win some wavering doubters to his side. But his position is steadily growing weaker.

If the President is innocent in the cover-up acts of his aides, he could easily gain adherents by turning over the 27 tapes that Jaworski wants and the 42 that the House Judiciary Committee is seeking. That would dispel many suspicions, and it would certainly not "destroy" the presidency. Since he has given up 19 tapes and 700 documents already, why would turning over more tapes break the back of this most visible of U.S. institutions? If he is not innocent the current collision course with the Congress may be the only viable one for him.

Gentler Approach. Perhaps perceiving new dangers in a showdown with the impeachment committee, St. Clair seemed to soften his earlier stand. "We are not seeking a confrontation," he told TIME. "It would not be good for the President or the country. I think John Doar and I both believe that adjustments can be made to avoid it. I don't think the committee intends to have a fishing expedition." If this view seemed more conciliatory than those expressed by his unique client last week, perhaps the gentler approach is merely a shrewd tactic. Or maybe Lawyer James St. Clair deserves a more attentive audience within the confines of the Oval Office.


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Nixon's Taxes: "A Shocker"

Another big bombshell is about to go off under the President. The Congressional Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, which Nixon asked to look into two questionable tax entries that he had made on his returns for 1969 and 1970, is expected to release its preliminary report late this week or next week. Says one senior Senator on the committee: "It will be a shocker."

Congressman Wilbur Mills, the influential and powerful chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, added: "If Watergate brought pressure on Nixon to resign, our report will bring about a great deal more pressure. I don't believe that he will be able to withstand it." A congressional staff member said that Nixon may well wind up owing more than \$500,000 in taxes and penalties. For the years 1970 and 1971 he paid less than \$2,000 on a combined income of \$526,000.

The tax committee will not draw any conclusions on whether Nixon may have been guilty of fraud in filing his returns. It will leave any such determination up to the Judiciary Committee and Internal Revenue Service, which is belatedly rechecking Nixon's returns. The report by the joint committee will merely indicate those deductions that it considers should not have been allowed and will



CONGRESSMAN WILBUR MILLS

cite other taxes that it judges the President owes. (Though the committee's findings are not binding, the President has promised to accept their ruling and pay accordingly.) It would be wrong to allege fraud, Mills explained, "because half the members of the committee are Senators, and they may have to serve as a jury on impeachment." In other words, Senators should not accuse Nixon if they also may have to stand in judgment of him later.

The committee is expected to con-

clude that Nixon owes some \$300,000 in back taxes for having taken a deduction of \$482,000 for the gift of his vice-presidential papers—a transaction that he has conceded may not have been completed before a law banning such deductions went into effect. While Nixon will not be accused of fraud because a deed and other papers completing the transaction apparently were backdated to get them within the deadline, the committee may put blame on those who prepared the returns. That could apply pressure on Nixon's lawyers to explain the transactions more fully in order to avoid criminal charges themselves.

Also certain to be cited as another Nixon tax error was his failure to report a \$142,000 profit on the sale of his Manhattan apartment in 1969 and to pay a capital gains tax on it. Nixon had asked the committee to examine both this sale and the deduction for his papers. The probers have gone beyond these matters and apparently have discovered other Nixon tax errors. Insists Mills: "People can better understand a failure to pay taxes than they can understand Watergate. Overdeductions, failure to state income—this will be a report to the American people. And they can draw their own conclusions." The conclusions may be particularly bitter because the report will be released just at the time when Americans are paying their own income taxes.

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Guess Who's Trying to be Henry Superspy?

Inside the American Intelligence Establishment

Who's Who and What's Happening in the Spy Business
—A Long Look Behind the Classified Curtain

By Tad Szulc

One day it is the controversy over the Central Intelligence Agency's role in Watergate. Another day it is a piece of inept CIA skulduggery in a remote province in Thailand. Then it is the grudging admission that quite a few American newsmen have been operating as CIA informants abroad. Or the discovery that the agency has been secretly training Tibetan guerrillas in Colorado, and Cambodian and Ugandan irregulars at hidden camps in Greece while bank-rolling colonels on the ruling Greek junta and financing famous European statesmen and contriving to overthrow the Libyan regime.

The CIA, it would seem, just cannot stay out of the headlines, which is a commentary on the agency itself and on the contradictions in our society. Though it obviously is one of the most secretive agencies in the United States government, the CIA probably receives more publicity than any Washington bureaucracy except for the White House. Most of this publicity is negative, sometimes indignant, often sensationalist, and frequently lopsided. The CIA's track record in the 27 years of its operations largely accounts for this lavish yet unwanted coverage—it's done everything from stealing the text of Khrushchev's secret Kremlin speech denouncing Stalin and the Bay of Pigs, to overthrowing foreign regimes, to running the Laos "Clandestine Army," and possibly outfitting the Watergate "Plumbers"—but it is our endless fascination with espionage and cloak-and-dagger stories that makes readers unfailingly receptive to stories and books about the CIA.

On a more serious level, however, our interest underlines the important point that a secret agency cannot function in utter secrecy in what still is a reasonably open society. The CIA is the subject of continued public scrutiny and debate—even if the scrutiny is superficial and the debate seldom well informed, and even if it is true that the agency has been allowed to run wild and uncontrolled. There is a growing view—reinforced by the Watergate affair—that the CIA should be made more accountable to proper Congressional committees as is, for example, the Atomic Energy Commission, whose work also is secret. Yet there is no other nation where key intelligence officials are as easily identifiable as in the United States and where the head of intelligence is

publicly and extensively questioned by the legislature—never mind how thoroughly—as William Egan Colby, the new CIA Director, was last year. And it is not all that hard for investigative reporters to track down some CIA actions, much to the agency's annoyance. In Britain, the Official Secrets Act would make this impossible. In France, the top-secret *Service du Territoire* would prevent it. So would Israel's Shin Bet, with the assistance of official censorship. In Communist countries, exposure of the security services is unthinkable.

Unsatisfactory as it is to those appalled by the CIA's excesses, the exposure that does exist in our democratic society clearly is a plus. Last year's discovery of the abortive 1970 White House plan for domestic intelligence (Tom Huston, its author, praised the CIA for its cooperative spirit in engineering it) underscored the importance of such exposure. So did disclosures of the CIA-run Operation Phoenix in Vietnam set up for murdering suspected Viet Cong agents. We are highly sensitized to the role of intelligence agencies here and abroad. But so strange is our morality that we usually tend to accept the national security need for building better and better nuclear arsenals but flinch indignantly at the notion of American involvement in global intelligence operations.

This is where the contradictions of our society come in. However, the reality is that effective foreign policy depends not only on classical political and economic diplomacy, but also on military deterrents and the availability of solid intelligence. To abolish our intelligence services would be tantamount to unilateral nuclear disarmament, something not seriously proposed here. We must live with the reality that the CIA and its sister agencies will go on existing; so will the Soviet KGB's external operations.

Having said all these things, I should add that despite all the publicity about the CIA and company, the function of intelligence in the modern age is not always understood by the public or, for that matter, by our top policymakers. In fact, the entire American intelligence apparatus—not just the CIA—is undergoing a major institutional crisis. This crisis results in fairly equal parts from the profound political and technological changes affecting the world in the 1970s (perhaps not fully comprehended by the intelligence people themselves) and from the style of foreign policy as conducted by Richard Nixon and

Henry Kissinger. What is at issue now is the effectiveness of our intelligence machinery and the question of whether it is helped or hurt by Kissinger's decision to be the de facto chief intelligence officer of the United States in addition to serving as Secretary of State and the President's principal foreign policy advisor.

First, however, let's briefly look at the United States intelligence establishment.

In theory, the intelligence community is a unified body presided over by the United States Intelligence Board (USIB), which is directly responsible to the National Security Council at the White House and consequently to the President. The USIB is headed by the Director of the CIA, who also acts as Director of Central Intelligence and, again in theory, as chief of the intelligence community. William Colby replaced Richard Helms in this twin-post last September (there was a five-month interregnum during which James M. Schlesinger managed to shake up the community quite considerably before moving on to be Secretary of Defense), but there are no indications so far that Colby carries much more weight with the Nixon-Kissinger White House than did Helms. Helms, now Ambassador to Iran, was in deep disfavor with Kissinger. The White House tends to regard Colby as an efficient intelligence bureaucrat and administrator (despite his long career as a clandestine operator) who meets Kissinger's special requirements. So it is hard to think of Colby as the real chief of the intelligence community in the sense that Allen Dulles was when he was CIA director from 1953 to 1961. There seem to be no giants nowadays in the spying business. It has been touched by the age of mediocrity too.

The other agencies forming the USIB are the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), supposedly the spokesman for the Pentagon, but not always in tune with the intelligence experts of the Office of the Secretary of Defense or the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the National Security Agency (NSA), specializing in highly sophisticated electronic and technological intelligence gathering; the State Department's smallish but excellent Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), mainly concerned with analyzing political and economic intelligence; the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), which has its own intelligence-processing capability in the nuclear field; the Federal Bureau of Investiga-

tion, contributing counterespionage functions; and the Treasury Department, a fairly recent addition, which is involved in intelligence operations against narcotics traffic and which also runs the Secret Service.

Below the USIB, but connected with the major intelligence agencies, are such specialized organizations as the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), the most secret of them all. NRO's existence has been one of the intelligence community's best kept secrets. Its mission is to coordinate the so-called "overhead" reconnaissance conducted by Samos spy-in-the-sky satellites and high-flying planes like the SR-71, the successor to the famous U-2. The Air Force runs NRO with special funds—some estimates are that NRO spends \$1.5 billion annually, about a fifth of the total United States intelligence budget—and it is believed that the Under Secretary of the Air Force, currently James W. Plummer, is its immediate boss. Overhead reconnaissance is absolutely essential for the monitoring of military deployments by potential adversaries: The Samos satellite, for example, is the so-called "means of national verification" for the 1972 Soviet-American nuclear control agreements. It insures that the Russians are not cheating on the antiballistic missile (ABM) limitations or exceeding the number of land- or submarine-based missiles under the temporary accord on offensive strategic weapons. The Samos, with its high-precision photography, keeps Washington posted on every new missile site and type of weapon deployed by the Soviet Union. Thanks to the Samos we know that the Soviets are busily building their strength. And the Russians, of course, have their own version of the Samos to keep us honest.

NRO experts work closely with the huge National Security Agency (believed to employ more than 20,000 civilian and military specialists), both in actual overhead reconnaissance and in the parallel task of telemetry monitoring of Soviet advances in the development of Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) warheads. (These are multiple warheads, usually three, carried by individual ballistic missiles. Each can be guided separately to its assigned and very precise target.) Developing MIRV was a major American nuclear breakthrough, and for the last five years enormous effort has gone into monitoring Soviet tests to determine whether the Russians have it too. The American defense posture and disarmament negotiating stance depend on this knowledge. The intelligence community believes that the Soviet Union "MIRVed" last year, but is uncertain just how precise the Soviet targeting system is.

This information is the raw strategic intelligence that NRO and NSA feed to the CIA and the DIA—and ultimately to the USIB and the White House—for evaluation and interpretation. NSA also provides the intelligence community with a fantastic wealth of electronic intelligence—ELINT in the professional jargon—in addition to data on Soviet or Chinese military deployments and developments. NSA listening posts around the world eavesdrop on practically all the non-American (not only Communist) military radio, microwave, telex, and telephone traffic. They intercept conversations among Soviet MIG pilots; routine communications either in clear language or in code (one of

NSA's crucial functions is code-breaking as well as code-making) involving Warsaw Pact military units, Chinese, North Vietnamese, North Korean, and other Communist detachments; and just about everything of potential interest to the United States that can be overheard or copied. This work is done from secret land bases ranging from Ethiopia and the Indian Himalayas to Turkey and the Aleutian Islands as well as from ELINT ships (the Pueblo, captured by North Korea, was one) and ELINT aircraft flying all over the world. NSA-equipped and manned aircraft directed secret ground penetrating operations in Laos and Cambodia, and presumably do so now in other critical areas—the Middle East is probably one. It may one day be NSA's function to interrupt the worldwide United States military communications network with a message preceded by the code word CRITIC (which automatically gives it absolute priority over all other traffic) to alert the White House, the North American Defense Command in Colorado, and the Strategic Air Command in Omaha that enemy missiles or bombers have been launched—or are about to be—against the United States. The extra few seconds such a warning would provide before, say, a Soviet first strike would allow the United States to respond with a second strike from Minuteman missiles in North Dakota, Polaris and Poseidon nuclear submarines cruising under the oceans, and SAC B-52 bombers on permanent airborne alert.

But since a nuclear holocaust is not generally anticipated, the value of strategic intelligence relates to the construction of our defense and diplomatic policies. And this is where the intelligence community's current internal crisis appears in its most acute form. To be meaningful, strategic and tactical intelligence must be properly evaluated and interpreted. The National Security Agency and the National Reconnaissance Office produce and supply the raw intelligence for the CIA, DIA, and INR. But the CIA, DIA (and the individual military intelligence services), and INR also collect and produce intelligence they obtain through non-electronic means. Each agency plays a dual role and each has its own analyses, opinions, and biases. Each tries to influence policy, often for self-serving reasons. The CIA, for example, is barred by statute from formulating policies, but the CIA obviously holds policy views and subtly, if not always successfully, tries to influence national decision-making processes. During the latter part of the Vietnam war, for example, the agency continually warned against military over optimism and against underestimating North Vietnamese and Viet Cong power. The CIA urged realism in "Vietnamization" policies. On the other hand, it miscalculated the advantages of getting rid of Prince Norodom Sihanouk in Cambodia because it minimized the potential of the rebel Khmer Rouge guerrillas. The Administration accepted the CIA's Cambodia opinions with results that are less than felicitous. As will be seen, the CIA also had views on strategic negotiations that differed from those of other members of the intelligence community. It played an important role in helping to undermine the Socialist regime in Chile—this included strong policy views in favor of doing so—in addition to carrying out White House instructions in this area. In other

words, the CIA never simply cranked out intelligence without adding policy views.

The DIA, whose generals and admirals are concerned with the fortunes of the military profession, often seems to have a vested interest in "worst case" interpretations of intelligence data. Put simply, military analysts tend to suspect the worst concerning the potential enemy's intentions because that justifies requests for bigger budgets and appropriations for new weapons systems. Politically, "worst case" conclusions may bring trade-offs. In 1969, for instance, the Pentagon's insistence that the Russians had "MIRVed" (the CIA accurately concluded that they hadn't yet) forced Nixon and Kissinger to "buy it off": They promised appropriations for new weapons systems so that the military establishment would support the SALT I negotiations with the Russians. And so on.

Traditionally, the general idea always has been that the intelligence community, with all its various resources, would present the President with agreed estimates on everything from Soviet nuclear advances to Hanoi's intentions in Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia; the likelihood of a Soviet-Chinese war; the chances of a new Middle Eastern conflict; the survival power of the Socialist regime in Chile; and many other situations of concern to the United States.

When the CIA truly was Washington's pre-eminent intelligence organ, its Office of National Estimates prepared the so-called National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) on behalf of the entire intelligence community, although other agencies' dissenting views were duly noted. By and large, however, the NIEs were fairly sacrosanct.

But in June 1973, when Kissinger was the President's chief of staff for foreign affairs, the Office of National Estimates was abolished. John W. Huizenga, the Chief of National Estimates, was forced into premature retirement by Schlesinger. The changes were based on reorganization plans for the intelligence community that Schlesinger, then head of the Office of Budget and Management, prepared for the White House in November 1971. The new estimating system turned out to be more responsive to the special needs of the Nixon-Kissinger White House, and this is very much part of what is happening to the intelligence community.

Instead of a permanent estimates body, Colby, acting as Director of Central Intelligence, set up a corps of so-called National Intelligence Officers drawn from the CIA and other agencies to work on specific intelligence projects. This staff has the logistic support of the whole intelligence community. It is headed by George Carver, designated as Chief National Intelligence Officer, who operates directly under Colby with three deputies and approximately 30 National Intelligence Officers, although this figure probably will increase as the corps develops. Carver is a CIA veteran and a Vietnam expert. He first caught Kissinger's eye because he represented the CIA on the Vietnam Task Force, an interagency group, and occasionally on the National Security Council. In practice, Colby and Carver assign a specific project—it could be Arab attitudes on oil or the likelihood of a North Vietnamese offensive in 1974—as a National Intelligence Officer, who pulls together all

the necessary intelligence resources to produce a report submitted to Colby and then to the National Security Council, which means Henry Kissinger wearing the hat of Special Residential Assistant and/or chairman of the top-secret "40 Committee" in the NSC structure. This means that different senior estimators work on various projects rather than having the Office of National Estimates approving all the reports as it did in the past. Kissinger and his staff have direct access to the National Intelligence Officers when work is in progress, so Kissinger can better control the process of intelligence.

This is the most important structural and political change to affect the intelligence community since Helms was shipped to Iran early in 1973. Schlesinger's short reign at the CIA Langley headquarters produced some superficial changes: The staff was cut by nearly ten percent; scores of old-line "romantics" in the Clandestine Services were retired (E. Howard Hunt was retired by Helms in 1970); the agency was reorganized along more modern and efficient lines; and the importance of electronic intelligence was emphasized by bringing Pentagon "overhead" reconnaissance experts to Schlesinger's seventh-floor executive suite at Langley.

But the really significant change in the intelligence community's structure came with Kissinger's decision to atomize it and therefore bring it under his own tight control. Kissinger wanted to break the frequently artificial consensus of estimates and encourage a direct flow of intelligence from the various agencies to his own office in the White House where he and his National Security Council staff made the final estimates and evaluations.

This naturally led to a major controversy—an academic one, since Kissinger had the last word—between Kissinger and the traditionalists in the intelligence community. In brief, the opposing positions were these: Kissinger believed that the agreed national estimates were the lowest common denominator reached by agencies that often disagreed on interpretation of data—in his own words, he had to fight his way through "Talmudic" documents to find their real meaning; the traditionalists' view was that Kissinger was disrupting an orderly intelligence procedure in favor of his own biases, that he wanted interpretations to fit his preconceived policy opinions. Intelligence community veterans complain that Kissinger and his people now use the intelligence product capriciously and unprofessionally. They resent what they consider his "sloppy" handling of intelligence and his practice of eliminating top intelligence people from the decision-making process. They say that under the new system, the intelligence community, including Central Intelligence Director Colby, has no idea what happens to the intelligence product, such as the National Intelligence Officers' contribution, once it is fed into the White House machinery.

Even in Dick Helms' day, old-timers say, the Director of Central Intelligence rarely had a chance to defend his views at the White House because National Security Council meetings were increasingly infrequent and there was no other forum where he could speak out. In his latter years Helms had

virtually no direct access to Nixon, while Kissinger made no bones about his low opinion of the CIA boss. Colby, as far as it is known, is not faring much better with the White House. For example, when Kissinger and Schlesinger ordered the worldwide United States military alert during last October's Mideast crisis, Colby was not consulted beforehand. He simply was summoned after the decision was made and informed of it.

CIA officials also think that Kissinger often ignores agency views and estimates in favor of opinions more to his pragmatic liking. This, they say, is what happens when CIA and military intelligence differ considerably. The 1969 MIAV controversy was the first instance of it. Later the White House minimized CIA warnings that the Viet Cong was much stronger in Vietnam than the US Command in Saigon claimed and that pacification was far from successful. Kissinger, CIA people say, never requested the agency's opinion on the soundness of the DIA plan to snatch American war prisoners from the Santay camp in North Vietnam (the camp was empty when the raiders landed). No questions, they say, were put to the intelligence community when the Administration decided on the Cambodian invasion in 1970 (the military insisted they knew where to find the elusive COSVN command of the Viet Cong inside Cambodia; it has not been located to this day). No questions were put to the intelligence community when the White House decided to support the South Vietnamese thrust into Laos in 1971 to sever the Ho Chi Minh Trail (the operation failed). CIA people wonder why Kissinger never ordered the intelligence community to prepare studies on all these plans before deciding to carry them out.

Colby, a lifetime clandestine operator (he fought behind enemy lines in France and Norway as a young OSS officer in World War II, then made a CIA career in Vietnam as station chief and later as chief of the pacification program with ambassadorial rank), still chairs the USIB as Director of Central Intelligence—USIB now is mainly concerned with evaluating Soviet military and political strength. But Colby's power has been considerably eroded in comparison with that held by his CIA predecessors.

Individual intelligence agencies now are increasingly in rivalry with one another (the difference is that in the past natural rivalries were discouraged by the White House; now they seem to be encouraged) for the attention of Henry Kissinger and thus the President. To put it simply, Kissinger, who distrusts all bureaucracies including the intelligence community, devised a series of sophisticated moves to weaken the intelligence apparatus so that he could become the chief interpreter and arbiter of the intelligence product emanating from each agency.

Kissinger continues to control the National Security Council—he retains his post of White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs despite his new post as Secretary of State—and this preserves his control of the evaluation of intelligence. This is probably the most powerful function in the formulation of foreign policy, which can be evolved only on the basis of evaluated knowledge. That is what intelligence is all about. The Secretary of State has no such statutory power; traditionally he is a con-

sumer of intelligence. During Nixon's first term William P. Rogers simply relied on his own Intelligence and Research Bureau—and there are regrets at the State Department that he did not study that first-rate product sufficiently—but Kissinger, wearing his many hats, is both chief producer and chief consumer of the total intelligence available to the United States government. His CIA detractors call him the "super case officer" in the intelligence community.

Kissinger also has a handle on major intelligence decisions through his chairmanship of the "40 Committee" in the National Security Council. This is principally a policy body—the intelligence community, the Defense, State, and Justice departments are represented on it—that makes broad decisions in the field of intelligence and instructs the appropriate agencies to carry them out through their own means. Its name is derived from the number of the 1969 NSC memorandum that set it up in its present form. Earlier, the Committee was known as "5412," a memorandum number dating back to the Eisenhower Administration, and during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations as "303," this being the room number in the Executive Office Building where the group met. Britain has a similar body known as the "20 Committee," but its name is a product of British whimsicality. Since the British group was called by insiders the "double-cross committee," its chiefs translated the Roman numerals "XX" into the designation "20" for their outfit.

The "40 Committee" decisions must be personally approved by the President. Its agenda and the frequency of its meetings are secret, but it is assumed that all large-scale operations (as distinct from ongoing stand-aid activities) are reviewed there. This was the case, it is said, with the CIA's clandestine army in Laos and with Operation Phoenix in Vietnam. But it also is known that between 1970 and 1973 the "40 Committee" has concerned itself on a number of occasions with the Chilean situation before and after the election of Salvador Allende, the late president, as well as with such recondite matters as whether the Norwegian government would grant concessions to American oil firms. In the case of Norway, US policymakers felt that normal diplomatic pressures were inadequate and that intelligence resources were required. It is not clear just how the CIA went about this assignment. Likewise, the CIA's role in an abortive attempt to overthrow the Libyan regime some time in 1971 has not been fully explained—in fact, the whole operation remains an official secret. However, responsible sources claim the CIA was instructed to eliminate the radical government of Colonel Qaddafi when he threatened to nationalize US oil companies. Given the scope of United States interests, there is no limit to the situations the "40 Committee" may be drawn into.

Odd as it may sound, the "40 Committee" under Kissinger early realized that Soviet leaders should have a better understanding of the United States. The function of the American intelligence community is, by definition, to ferret out knowledge about the Soviet Union, but sophisticated thinkers here concluded that awesome policy errors in the Kremlin can be avoided if the Russians knew more about American attitudes and

potential reactions. It would be an exaggeration to suggest that the CIA is engaged in educating the KGB (although a peculiar rapport between them exists in certain fields such as security at the time of Nixon's Moscow visit and Brezhnev's Washington trip), but the intelligence community clearly was delighted some years ago when the Soviet Academy of Sciences organized its "USA" institute under Gyorgi Arbatov, a specialist on American affairs. The assumption here is that the new institute is performing a political intelligence function in conjunction with the KGB and the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

Speaking of the KGB, which is the CIA's principal opponent in intelligence wars, the private assessment here is that the Soviet service has been improving over the years, particularly with the advent of a new generation of analysts and estimators. Americans think, however, that the Russians are far behind us in electronic intelligence even though they, too, have equipment like overhead satellites.

Experts say that the KGB's internal defenses are strong. It is doubtful that the CIA ever really penetrated it, although there was the case of Colonel Oleg Penkovsky, a senior KGB officer who allegedly served British and American intelligence for years as a double agent. Despite claims here, it remains unclear what precisely Penkovsky really did for the West. Because it is both a domestic security service (in the FBI sense) and an international intelligence agency like the CIA, the KGB obviously is hard to penetrate. CIA Director Colby made this point indirectly when he told a Congressional committee in executive session late last year that he was spending much of his time trying to penetrate the Soviet Communist party.

It is presumed to be among the "40 Committee" functions to supervise secret intelligence agreements with friendly countries. Such agreements exist with Britain, Canada, Australia, South Africa, and Israel, among others. The CIA and the British MI-6 occasionally exchange agents when it is convenient for one service to work under the cover of the other, but the principal aim of the agreements is the exchange of intelligence. A secret British-American intelligence group thus functions at the British Embassy in Washington. There are extremely close ties with Canada; recent published reports said that Canadian intelligence personnel worked hand in hand with the CIA here and in Ottawa. Finally, there is an intelligence exchange agreement within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, but this is a more limited arrangement because of what the CIA sees as the dangers of leaks to the Soviets.

Despite budget and personnel cuts, internal divisions, rivalries, and frustrations, the United States intelligence community is a formidable empire. It is believed to employ around 100,000 people in all the agencies (not counting the FBI) and its annual budget is somewhere between \$6 billion and \$7 billion, the bulk of the money going to the expensive technological operations in the National Security Agency and the National Reconnaissance Office. Although the CIA is overseen by special Congressional appropriations subcommittees, its budgeting, like that of the NSA, DIA, and NRO, does not appear on the books. Instead, the Office of Budget and Management hides it in appropriations for other government agen-

cies. Sometimes agencies like the Agency for International Development spend their own funds on the CIA's behalf, as was done in Laos and Vietnam, to be paid back later.

The intelligence community, especially the CIA, also works through innumerable fronts, often supposed businesses, and channels funds for political operations through labor and cultural groups. At the peak of the Vietnam war the CIA owned at least two airlines—Air America Inc. (still operating) and Southern Air Transport, (being sold). It also had contracts with several bona fide US carriers. Southern Air Transport carried out a number of secret operations in the Caribbean in recent years. The CIA still charters Southeast Air Transport planes to such agencies as AID to bring Latin American students and professionals to the US for conferences and other meetings sponsored by the US government. In 1964 a special company was set up in Miami to recruit Cuban pilots, veterans of the Bay of Pigs, for secret operations in the Congo. In earlier years the CIA subsidized the National Students' Association, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, the Congress for Cultural Freedom, and a series of related magazines here and in Western Europe. Although the CIA is barred by law from operating in the United States (except at its Virginia headquarters), the agency still maintains covert offices in Miami, New York, New Orleans, San Francisco, and Charleston, South Carolina. CIA officials say these offices support foreign operations and, among other functions, help to debrief interesting travelers returning from abroad. But in the course of Watergate investigations it developed that Langley headquarters as well as the CIA offices in Miami and San Francisco provided logistic support for the White House "Plumbers." One employee, in fact, still was on the CIA payroll when he was arrested at the Watergate office building in June 1972.

Basically, the CIA is divided into two main departments: operations and analysis. There are experts in Washington who hold the CIA analysis branch in extremely high esteem, but tend to be skeptical of the operators. The two departments are often at odds politically: the operators often dismiss the estimators as "eggheads" while the analysts think of the operators as a wild bunch. This situation is changing as more and more old-timers, mostly OSS veterans, retire, a new generation of agents and analysts enters the CIA ranks, and the needs of intelligence, especially in electronic intelligence, change along with the rest of the world. But there also are stresses inside the clandestine services. "Action" officers—the "black" operators and paramilitary specialists—are more gung-ho than what the CIA calls covert political operatives, and this, too, leads to internal disagreements.

Top specialists in their fields still are hired from the outside—the CIA has experts on everything from West African culture to Filipino tribal myths and the effects of the Humboldt Current on fisheries in the Pacific—but the basic recruitment is mainly from colleges and universities. The decision whether a recruit should be assigned to operations or analysis is usually made during an initial stage at the CIA's "basic training" school on Glebe Road in Virginia. Recruits selected for operations are assigned to a tough course at a special school known as

"The Farm," near Yorktown, Virginia. Promising analysts may be sent back to universities for postgraduate studies in various disciplines.

Traditionally, the CIA has been run by men from the clandestine services. The most notable CIA director with this background was Allen Dulles, probably the best intelligence operator the OSS had in Europe during the war. Richard Helms ran the clandestine services before rising to the directorship. William Colby served briefly as deputy director for plans (the "dirty tricks" division) after his return from Vietnam and before being named Director last year. As CIA Director and Director of Central Intelligence, Colby, a 54-year-old self-effacing but tough man, is backstopped by Lieutenant General Vernon (Dick) Walters, the Deputy Director of Intelligence. Walters, an extraordinary linguist, spent much of his Army career as a military or defense attaché overseas, but he is not considered an expert on either analysis or clandestine operations. It was Walters's lot, however, to be drawn into the Watergate cover-up controversy when the White House tried to get the CIA to take the blame for the "Plumbers" and pay their salaries after they went to prison.

Schlesinger and Colby reorganized the CIA structure to a considerable extent. The old Plans Department (DDP) was renamed Directorate for Operations (DDO), absorbing the scientific and technical divisions. It is headed by William Nelson, a clandestine services veteran from the Far East, who took Colby's former job. Colby, not being a professional estimator, has kept on Richard Lehmann, a highly respected official, as Deputy Director for Current Intelligence (DDI). Lehmann works with George Carver in the new National Intelligence Officers' system. Major General Daniel C. Graham, brought from the Pentagon by Schlesinger, is in charge of "overhead" intelligence, his speciality. He works directly with Colby, but he feels strongly that military intelligence at the Pentagon should become more sophisticated so that it would not lose influence to the civilian agencies.

CIA officials say that the new electronic intelligence systems have cut down the agency's clandestine work through agents. After all, enormous resources are earmarked for worldwide eavesdropping and celestial reconnaissance. But, they hasten to add, the CIA has not lost its capabilities in this field. It retains its paramilitary organization. Many agents are involved in the new government-wide operations against the traffic in narcotics and against international terrorists. The agency, in fact, seeks to project an image of concentration in these areas. More recently, the CIA was asked by the new Federal Energy Office to monitor the movements of oil tankers throughout the world to determine shipping patterns during the energy crisis. Deeply involved in the corporate affairs of the oil industry, the CIA is believed to be the only government agency to have been able to compile a list of joint ventures in the petroleum industry. This is a top-secret document both from the viewpoint of the CIA and the oil industry.

There is no question, either, that the CIA remains deeply involved in covert political action everywhere in the world. The latest example of such activities concerned the CIA agent in northeastern Thailand who faked a letter to the Bangkok government

from a guerrilla leader proposing negotiations. This was a classical example of the "disinformation" technique, intended to embarrass the guerrilla leader with his followers and thus weaken the subversive movement. But the new Thai government took a dim view of the CIA's involvement in domestic politics and a scandal developed, especially because the American Ambassador, Robert Kintner, has a CIA background himself. Intelligence specialists here think the letterwriting agent exceeded his authority—and did a sloppy job to boot—and this episode already has resulted in the recall of B. Hugh Tovar, the chief of the big CIA station in Thailand, and has complicated our diplomatic relations with the Thais.

The Thailand incident also served to underscore the extent to which the CIA operates abroad in conjunction with local security services. In exchange for intelligence or whatever special favors it desires from local police or counterinsurgency forces (often for reasons having nothing to do with the interests of the host country), the CIA may provide them with training or special equipment. Thailand, where the United States has vast interests and where there is a local insurgency problem, is a case in point. But it also has been argued that this system has resulted in indirect CIA support for police forces in politically repressive governments from Latin America to Asia and Africa. Last year, responding to Congressional pressures, the CIA promised to end its secret programs of actually training foreign police forces.

I made the point earlier that there are no giants in the United States intelligence community. This may be partly due to Henry Kissinger's forceful personality—he overshadows other figures in the intelligence establishment. And the recent quick turnover in top intelligence jobs has left the community in flux and uncertainty, aggravated by the Kissinger-imposed strictures on its modus operandi.

At the CIA, for example, William Colby still is new in his job and judgments are being reserved as to his efficiency and the value of his innovations. The main concern in the CIA is that he assert his independence toward the White House, particularly in the area of estimates. Thus far his public image has not been bad. He is available to testify before Congressional committees much more frequently than Helms did—late last

year he appeared before two separate subcommittees to discuss the CIA's involvement (or, as he claims, non-involvement) in the Chilean situation. He has testified on Watergate as often as he was called.

In the State Department, the new man in charge of intelligence is William Hyland, a former CIA official, a distinguished expert on Soviet affairs, and a Kissinger protégé. He worked for Kissinger in the planning section of the National Security Council staff. But he has been in his new post only since last December.

The Defense Intelligence Agency, a 5,000-man operation, is headed by Vice Admiral Vincent P. dePoix, an austere man who has held his job since early 1973. The National Security Agency has a new Director in Air Force Lieutenant General Lewis Allen who was brought to the CIA from the DIA last year by Dr. Schlesinger, then appointed to head the NSA. He is another top specialist in "overhead" intelligence. Both dePoix and Allen are career military intelligence officers with highly technical backgrounds. They are little known outside the professional intelligence community. Few Washingtonians recognize Admiral dePoix or General Allen on the rare occasions when either comes to lunch downtown.

It is probably too early to assess whether Kissinger's domination of the American intelligence operation is good for the country. But there are thoughtful intelligence specialists who have serious reservations about it. Experienced intelligence people see a danger in the dual role Kissinger is determined to play: He may be tempted to interpret intelligence data to fit his policy concepts. They think he did so last year when he apparently ignored CIA and INR warnings that the Egyptians and the Syrians were actively planning an attack on Israel because of his conviction that the Soviets would not abet an operation that would endanger the détente they had worked out with him. This, CIA people think, was a classic example of how a statesman can become the intellectual prisoner of his own ideas.

Finally, there is the notion that to be useful, intelligence must be totally detached from the policy-making process. This concept of intelligence independence was a cornerstone of the legislation that created the CIA in 1947. Yet Kissinger seems determined to weld together the functions of intelligence and policy formulation, perhaps disregarding the profound difference between capabilities and intent of hostile parties. To

differentiate between them is, after all, the principal function of sophisticated intelligence. Kissinger's technique, possibly a plausible one under the existing system of government in Washington, is simply to throw specific hard questions at the intelligence people, receive the answers, and then make his own judgments.

The question, therefore, is whether American intelligence is more effective than before—in the most professional sense of the word. Allowing for the fact that it may still be premature to render hard judgments—the intelligence community, after all, is in flux—there seems to be growing evidence that the present period is bound to be transitional because it does not satisfy the emerging policy needs.

The intelligence community itself feels shackled by the White House in the intellectual dimension of its work. Being a bureaucracy, it cannot function as efficiently as it should when it believes (rightly or wrongly) that fundamental concepts of the use of intelligence are being violated at the top of the Administration. This is something that Henry Kissinger, whatever hat he may be wearing, is bound to discover sooner or later. This is not to say, of course, that every bureaucracy should not be shaken up periodically. The perpetuation of old habits leads to sloppiness and opposition to new ideas.

Quite possibly, the real change will come when the new generation of intelligence specialists replaces the "old spies" who still think in terms of World War II, the OSS, and the Cold War. Be that as it may, enormous care must be exercised to prevent the intelligence product from being misused politically, as often appears to be the case at this juncture, to satisfy grandiose policy concepts politically useful to the White House or the new State Department under Kissinger. The tendency still is too strong to shoot the bearer of ill tidings—carefully constructed policies are not challenged by cold evidence. Soviet cheating on the détente, a sacred Nixon achievement, must not be ignored to prevent the détente from collapsing. This is the principal example. There may be others. The object, then, is to make professional intelligence a respected servant of policy. And a final word: The surest way to demoralize the intelligence community is to try to involve it, as the Nixon Administration tried to do, in such nefarious doings as Watergate and its cover-ups. □

WASHINGTON POST

18 March 1974

HST on Intermecine Spying

Anent the current backbiting among the Executive and the CIA and the Defense Establishment about intermecine spying, the following excerpt from Margaret Truman's book about her dad, page 332, is both human and enlightening:

"Dad was even able to joke about serious things. One of his proudest accomplishments as President was the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency. Before it was established, intelligence was gathered by a half dozen agencies, and very little of it reached the President. One day he sent the following memorandum to Admiral Leahy and Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, the first CIA chief:

"To My Brethren and Fellow Dog-

house B.izens: By virtue of the authority vested in me as Top Dog I require and charge that Front Admiral William D. Leahy and Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, receive and accept the vestments and appurtenances of their respective positions, namely as personal snooper and as director of centralized snooping. . . . I charge that each of you not only seek to better our foreign relations through more intensive snooping but also keep me informed constantly of the movements and actions of the other, for without such coordination there can be no order and no aura of mutual trust." H.S.T."

NORMAN O. TIETJENS,
Judge, United States Tax Court.

Washington.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
19 March 1974

CIA finds self suspect, in theory made

By David Southard
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Bangkok, Thailand

Few Asians have much that is good to say about the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

The CIA is suspected of all sorts of nefarious schemes, and the schemes are not always believed to be directed against communists.

Thailand recently had its troubles with a bogus letter sent by a CIA agent to the Thai Prime Minister. The agent's action was considered by many Thais to be an example of blatant interference in Thailand's internal affairs.

But one of Thailand's highest officials says that despite this incident — which the United States insists was unauthorized — the CIA is needed in

Thailand and is of help to the Thai Government.

Useful intelligence

"The United States has facilities to obtain intelligence which we don't have," said Deputy Prime Minister Sudch Nimmankhem in an interview with this reporter.

"And there is some intelligence [obtained by the CIA] which is useful to us," he said.

"This is especially true when it comes to what is happening in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam," the Thai official said.

"Sometimes people overstep their intelligence-gathering role," he said, referring to the bogus letter.

"But it is like the tongue and the teeth. Sometimes the teeth bite the tongue . . . but it is not intentional."

Well-informed sources in Bangkok say that there were until recently about 150 CIA agents operating in Thailand but that there has been "some reduction" in that number. The reduction apparently relates mostly to cutbacks in CIA operations in neighboring Laos. Some of the CIA men stationed in Thailand have been used to support the agents who used to advise and supply troops fighting for the Royal Laotian Government.

The reduction has involved the closing down of installations at a number of unspecified places in Thailand, according to informed sources.

One place so affected was believed to be Sakol Nakorn in northeastern Thailand, where the CIA author of the infamous fake letter was stationed.

The letter, purporting to be from the Communist-led insurgent movement, proposed to the Thai Government that it negotiate with the insurgents. The fake letter was apparently meant either to encourage defections from the insurgent ranks or to impress Thai officials with the seriousness of the insurgent threat.

But in either case, when its origins were revealed by the Thai press, the letter succeeded only in provoking protests against the CIA.

The fake letter was traced to its sender because a Thai assistant to the CIA agent mistakenly sent the letter by registered mail, thus revealing the agent's address.

The agent, whose name was never disclosed, was ordered to leave Thailand by U.S. Ambassador William Kinross almost immediately after the incident was publicized.

A spokesman for Kinross later declared that the sending of the letter had not been authorized by the U.S. Embassy and that action would be taken against the CIA agent. He assured Thai officials that there would never be a recurrence of such an incident.

The incident triggered a protest demonstration by several thousand Thai students in front of the U.S. Embassy in early January.

WASHINGTON POST
15 March 1974

Voice of America and Solzhenitsyn

The March 7 Evans and Novak column, "Voice of America Speechless on 'Gulag Archipelago'" is a gross distortion of the record of VOA's coverage of Mr. Solzhenitsyn, his book, and the dissident movement in the Soviet Union.

VOA has covered fully and factually the developing of Mr. Solzhenitsyn and the publication of "Gulag Archipelago," as it has covered other aspects of the dissident movement. Since the book was published on December 23, the book and Mr. Solzhenitsyn's plight have been reported almost hourly in VOA Russian language newscasts, and more than 188 reports and features on the subject have been broadcast in other political programming — 367 times, counting repeats through March 6. These figures do not include news items.

Seeking to reflect a balanced projection of American and world reaction to events in the Soviet Union, VOA has given substantial coverage to the views of responsible American and other Western observers, including comments by the President, the Secretary of State, and members of Congress and to editorials in major U.S. newspapers and statements by public figures elsewhere in the world. In these broadcasts, there have been accounts of "Gulag Archipelago" as it has been described by reviewers in the United States and other countries. The titles of some of these programs give an indication of their content: "Solzhenitsyn Denounces Lies of Soviet System," "Solzhenitsyn Biography," "New York Times on Solzhenitsyn," "Solzhenitsyn on Soviet Law,"

"Expulsion of Solzhenitsyn in World Press," "Gulag Book of the Month," and so forth.

VOA's thorough reporting on Solzhenitsyn and "Gulag Archipelago" has been criticized on a continuing basis by Soviet officials.

USIA's approach is exactly the same now as it was before the Soviet Union ceased furnishing in September without our foreknowledge and without explanation. Reading from a book as the authors of the article note, would be far outside the normal life of Voice of America programming.

Since 1930, the Voice of America has operated under a set of three guiding principles. VOA's goal is to serve as "a consistently reliable and authoritative source of news," to present a balanced and comprehensive projection of significant American thought and institutions, and "as an official radio, VOA will present the policies of the United States clearly and effectively."

Hence, the comments of Helmut Evans and Novak that it is "shocking . . . that VOA is being switched from no-holds-barred news into a policy arm of the U.S." indicates a lack of understanding of the purposes of the Voice of America.

On the other hand, Radio Liberty, consistent with its own mission, is broadcasting the text of the letter to the people of the Soviet Union. Radio Liberty, while also funded by the U.S. government, does not serve as the official voice.

MARGITA E. WHITE,
Assistant Director (Public Information),
U.S. Information Council,
Washington.

WASHINGTON POST

15 MARCH 1974

CIA Finds Itself Suspect

Recorded by IPI

Router

ZURICH, March 14 — The International Press Institute today described as "appalling" a press report that more than 50 journalists were on the payroll of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Director Ernest Meyer said the report, published in the Washington Star-News, indicated that some journalists could betray their profession by serving as the ears and eyes of official intelligence while employed as newspapermen.

BALTIMORE SUN

11 MAR 1974

Helms Says Barker Fired for Gambling

United Press International

The Central Intelligence Agency fired convicted water-gate burglar Bernard L. Barker in the mid-1960s because he was involved with "gambling and criminal elements," according to former CIA director Richard Helms.

Barker is the man who worked for E. Howard Hunt Jr. during the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. In the spring of 1971 he recruited, at Hunt's request, the burglary team that broke into the Los Angeles office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist and subsequently was caught in the 1972 Watergate break-in.

Barker and five others were indicted Thursday for allegedly conspiring to violate the civil rights of Dr. Lewis Fielding, Ellsberg's psychiatrist. He has served a year in jail after pleading guilty in the June, 1972, break-in of Democratic National Committee headquarters at the Watergate complex.

Helms' testimony, given to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee behind closed doors on Feb. 7, 1973, was made public yesterday. The hearings were held on the nomination of Helms to be Ambassador to Iran.

Barker's attorney, Daniel F. Schultz, promptly denied Helms' description of why Barker was terminated by the CIA.

"Mr. Helms' testimony is inconsistent with official information we have received from the CIA. It is categorically denied by Mr. Barker and is simply not true," Schultz said.

Helms' statement on Barker appeared to conflict with Barker's account of his relations with the CIA given in sworn testimony before the Senate Watergate committee May 24, 1973, 3½ months after Helms testified at the Foreign Relations Committee.

Helms told the committee about Barker:

"During the Bay of Pigs he was one of the Cuban derivatives who was involved in that operation and it is my recollection that all lines with him on the part of the agency were eliminated some time in the middle '60s.

Barker, testifying to the Watergate committee, said he

left the CIA immediately after the end of the Bay of Pigs operation in April, 1961, and had no further connection with it until Hunt approached him 10 years later to set up the burglary team.

CIA spokesmen said it would be "difficult" to find out exactly when Barker left the agency or the circumstances.

Helms Tells of Using

Top U.S. Businessmen

Review

Richard Helms, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, has told senators he had a policy of going right to the top of American business firms in trying to get their cooperation in gathering intelligence overseas.

Helms now is ambassador to Iran. During a closed-door hearing on his ambassadorial nomination, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in February, 1973, Helms said the CIA did not press businessmen or others to pass on potentially useful information they may have obtained while visiting the Soviet Union or other countries.

"There is no payment of money. There is no effort to twist anyone's arm. We simply are giving them an opportunity as patriotic Americans to say what they know about this."

Answering questions about contacts with American business firms abroad under CIA's Domestic Contact Service, he said: "It has been my own feeling that one should start with the chief executive officer normally because it is not fair to these companies to set up a relationship with somebody down the line that the chief executive officer does not know about or, at least has not indicated that this other man is your point of contact."

An estimated 200 persons are operating as intelligence agents under the guise of businessmen, according to recent American press reports quoting an unnamed American official who apparently is familiar with the inner workings of the CIA.

BALTIMORE SUN

19 March 1974

Book on CIA criticized for concept on secrets

Washington (AP)—Government attorneys argued yesterday that the authors of a book critical of the Central Intelligence Agency have adopted a "strained, inoperative" concept of how national secrets are classified.

They made the contention in final arguments on the case of "The CIA: The Cult of Intelligence," after which Judge Albert V. Bryan, Jr., in United States District Court in nearby Alexandria, Va., took it under advisement. He did not indicate when he will rule.

Attorneys for the authors, Victor L. Marchetti and John D. Marks, argued that the Justice Department had failed to prove that material which the CIA has ordered deleted from the manuscript was actually classified secret.

Floyd Abrams, representing Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., the publisher, said that at the trial "we needed the man who classified it, or some documentary evidence that it was classified" to justify its deletion.

The deputy assistant attorney general, Irwin Goldbloom, replied that Mr. Abrams had adopted "a strained, inoperative concept" of how the classification procedure works. It is not possible, Mr. Goldbloom said, to feed questions into a computer and get back data on who classified material, or when.

At the 2½-day trial, most of it behind closed doors, four CIA deputy directors testified that the 162 deletions ordered taken from the manuscript were properly labeled secret

and remain classified.

He said their testimony, based on review of the manuscript last September, amounted to an updating of the classification. That is, he said, their testimony was that the material should still be stamped secret or top secret.

Melvin L. Wolf of the American Civil Liberties Union, which is representing the authors, said the case has important First Amendment implications, posing the question, "Are the people going to be informed about an important agency which he said operates both overseas and domestically?"

"The American people have been deprived, I think by design, of a great deal of information about the CIA... of activities around the globe undertaken in their name," he said.

Mr. Wolf said it is Mr. Marchetti's stated purpose "to reform the agency and not blow it out of the water."

Mr. Marchetti, a former CIA employee for 14 years, was enjoined by Judge Bryan 23 months ago from publishing any CIA secrets without submitting the manuscript to the agency for review. Mr. Marks, a former State Department employee, has agreed to be bound by the same terms.

Knopf plans to publish the book within a few months—with blank spaces for the 162 deletions unless the CIA position is overturned by the courts. The deletions range from single words to entire pages of the manuscript.

WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS

Washington, D. C., Sunday, March 17, 1974

CIA Apologizes For Error About Bernard Barker

Associated Press

The Central Intelligence Agency today said it had apologized on behalf of its former director, Richard Helms, for his testimony stating that Watergate figure Bernard Barker was fired because of involvement in gambling and other criminal associations.

CIA officials said Barker, convicted for the 1972 break-in of the Democratic National Committee headquarters, had actually left

the agency in good standing.

Helms, currently U.S. ambassador to Iran, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Feb. 7 that Barker had been dismissed in the middle 1960's when "we found out he was involved in certain gambling and criminal elements."

The testimony was not released until last Monday.

After its publication, Barker complained to the CIA. Agency officials said a check of the records showed that Helms was in error and after being informed of this the ambassador asked that Barker be extended an apology.

The Washington Morning-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Tuesday, March 19, 1974

Baker Ties CIA Over Watergate

Jack Anderson

Sen. Howard H. Baker Jr. (R-Tenn.), the Senate Watergate malice idol, has been dealing behind the scenes with embattled ex-White House aide Charles W. Colson in a joint effort to implicate the Central Intelligence Agency in the Watergate break-in and cover-up.

Although Colson exercised his Fifth Amendment rights at the Senate hearing, he has collaborated quietly with Baker's top committee aide, Fred Thompson, in the desperate attempt to shift more of the Watergate blame to the CIA.

Colson has also been in touch with the White House on the CIA angle. This has caused suspicion that the Baker-Colson maneuver may be a White House ploy to divert public attention from President Nixon's own administration.

Sources close to Baker hotly

deny that the CIA investigation is a diversionary action. They say he is hard at work on a detailed report, which they promised will be a "bombshell." From hints we have gotten of snarls in Baker's possession, "bombshell" is a fair description of what he has received.

For months, Baker has dabbled with the idea that the CIA really engineered the celebrated break-in at Democratic headquarters for "national security" reasons and then pulled strings to hush it up. But he has never seemed to be able to get his theory to jell.

What finally persuaded him he was right, our sources say, was the admission by the CIA on Jan. 29 that tapes of CIA conversations were destroyed during the Watergate period—after Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) has specifically requested that they be preserved.

At Baker's instigation, former CIA chief Richard Helms, now ambassador to Iran, was hauled before the committee a week ago under the most secret conditions.

In addition to Baker and Thompson, the session was also attended by Chairman Sam J. Ervin Jr. (D-N.C.), counsel Sam Dash and a few trusted aides. Also present, surprisingly, was Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.), who heads the Senate's hush-hush CIA oversight subcommittee.

For four hours, the chain-smoking Helms was grilled about the CIA's part in the Watergate events. We have learned that the secret transcripts show that Baker's questions were aimed at uncovering a hidden CIA involvement.

Baker seemed convinced, for example, that Helms personally ordered the tapes destroyed. Our sources say that Helms

skillfully carried Baker's questions and did not incriminate the CIA.

Once the hearing was over, Baker and Thompson went to work on the report. It probably will be submitted to Symington's Subcommittee for Security Review.

Baker, meanwhile, is expected to demand that all CIA documents in the Watergate case be declassified. He has claimed privately that these papers will bolster his case. Others who have had access to the documents insist they may raise more questions than they answer.

Footnote: Baker could not be reached. Colson, Thompson and Dash refused to provide any details about the CIA investigation. Thompson, however, said: "Hopefully, the entire picture will be made public. At that time, people can make their own judgments."

MICHIGAN STATE NEWS, (EAST LANSING, MICHIGAN)

20 FEB 1974

Hecklers disrupt CIA chief's

By JIM MEEGSTRA

State News Staff Writer

Twenty to 30 people questioned, heckled and laughed at a Central Intelligence Agency branch chief on campus Tuesday.

Philip A. True, head of the East Asia Branch of the CIA Office of Basic and Geographic Intelligence, was invited by the MSU Geography Dept. Colloquium Committee to speak on applied geographic research in the CIA.

The protesters, representing the Young Socialist Alliance and the Southern African Liberation Committee, packed the back of a small room in the Natural Science Building and spilled into the hall. Approximately 25 other people attending seemed to be nonprotesters.

Before True was introduced, Barbara Biemer, asst. professor of psychology, stated the protesters' position that the CIA has no right to speak at MSU because of its active suppression of democratic freedoms.

An older geography major who could not get into the room said: "It's unfair, that these protesters should create a stir and take seats away from those who want to hear. They should make their point at the beginning and then leave."

A single page statement handed out by the protesters at the door, claimed:

"The CIA is attempting to suppress publication of the book 'Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia' by Alfred McCoy, which documents CIA

participation in heroin traffic.

"The CIA is in court to stop a former agent from publishing his memoirs.

"The MSU Vietnam Project from 1955 to 1961 was used as a front for the CIA, violating the Geneva convention.

The handout also claimed that the CIA "subverts the basic human rights of life and liberty and democratic self-determination," citing "well documented involvement" in Cambodia, Laos, Chile, Brazil, Guatemala, Iran and Greece. True remained calm, ignoring heckling and giggling throughout his 25-minute description of what CIA geographers and cartographers do.

When True finished, Bill Buckler, Geography Dept. graduate assistant, said: "On behalf of those here, I thank you for your talk and apologize for the disruptions."

Asked about geographical research behind the bombing of the Red River dikes in North Vietnam, True said no information on that had been requested from his department as far as he knew.

After failing to respond to several long, complex questions from protesters, True was asked if he was under orders not to answer.

"If I don't know, I can't answer," True said. "The questions seemed more like statements to me."

At the end, True thanked the group for an interesting and stimulating hour, and said he would be willing to come back to MSU anytime. Several persons shouted, "Please don't!"

NEW YORK TIMES

10 March 1974

Business and Spying Mix, But Not Always

The American businessman active in trade and investment matters in such politically sensitive listening posts as Hong Kong and Vienna may be—"Shhh!"—an American spy.

That's not exactly news to the natives, who have developed a sharp eye for the American—or, for that matter, English, Russian or any other—espionage agent, but it's unusual for the spy industry's home office to let out statistics on this aspect of its work, as an unnamed official in Washington did recently.

Unbending with New York Times reporter David Binder and requesting, naturally, that his name not be used and his department not be identified, the official dropped these tidbits:

There are more than 200 American Intelligence agents stationed abroad posing as businessmen. Some are full-time operatives, and the business concerns that provide their "cover" receive payments from the United States Government to help defray business overhead. Others are part-timers.

Some are "a pain in the neck." They spend "10 minutes a day" on intelligence and the rest of the time making money. But some, both part-time and full-time, are very valuable.

GENERAL

NEW YORK TIMES
11 March 1974

NEW YORK TIMES
11 March 1974
PAGE ONE
DOMESTIC

Agricultural Imports Expected to Rise 150% in Two Years to Meet World Demand

By DOUGLAS B. HARTLAND

When Americans push shopping carts through their supermarkets, not many of them are aware that they are now competing for much of the food they buy with people in Japan, Western Europe, the Soviet Union, China and most of the rest of the world. But they are.

Agricultural and economics experts agreed in Washington over the last three weeks that a major reason for some of the sharp increases in food prices in recent years had been the sudden and vast expansion of agricultural exports from the United States.

In the fiscal year ending June 30, 1972, the total value of American agricultural exports was \$8 billion. For the year ending this June 30, the Government is estimating total agricultural sales abroad at \$20 billion, 2½ times as much.

"We had a hellish big increase in quantity, but a lot of it was in price," said Kenneth O. Stephens, deputy assistant sales manager in the Department of Agriculture's foreign agriculture service. "Maybe 50 per cent of this was price."

And Not in Sight

That is what happens when a lot of people are bidding for the existing products on the international market.

Discussions across the country with representatives of the food industry, officials of the Department of Agriculture, exporters, consulting agricultural economists and farmers themselves provided a consensus that the end of the expansion in foreign agricultural trade is not in sight.

Most Americans are familiar with the Soviet purchases of 350 million bushels of wheat in the late summer of 1972, which marked the beginning of the end of the 20-year surplus that had occurred for decades in the United States. But most of

the surplus was not sold to the Soviet Union. It was sold to other countries, mostly the United Kingdom and Japan.

The law of supply and demand is at work. As demand for food grows, the supply of food must grow. The demand of a hungry world, whose ever-increasing population is eating more and more food, is driving exporters and somewhat more affluent for food supplies that are having trouble keeping up.

For most of their histories, Americans have been accustomed to relatively cheap basic foodstuffs made possible by an abundance of land and highly produced vast supplies. The government, in turn, has spent billions to buy and store the leftovers and to pay farmers to keep a surplus in production.

Now, the surplus is a liability. It is a burden on the domestic market.

For instance, Japan has an insatiable appetite for soybeans, of which the United States is the world's biggest exporter. The demand may keep the price at a level that, in a side effect, adds considerably to the expense of feeding soybean products to poultry in this country and eventually to the cost of chickens to consumers. Likewise, a developing desire for more meat abroad may lead to a drastic increase in exports of American corn and other feed grains, pushing up their prices in making the cost of beef and pork much higher in the United States.

The change was caused by a number of things, such as the easing of restrictions on trade with Communist countries, disappointing crop crops in many parts of the world, a poor catch of anchovies (used for protein in feed) off Peru two years ago, rising world demand for wheat and wheat crop failures in Asia and aggressive salesmanship over the last few years by many American growers' associations and export companies.

But it has come about so fast, rapidly changing the traditional surplus in this country, that it has caught many by surprise.

Little public notice was paid to the shifting situation until the American Bakers Association recently began banging the Department of Agriculture to slow the record exports of wheat. The bakers sought the imposition of some sort of licensing controls, in effect, an embargo on new sales, lest the United States run out of wheat by the June 30 end of the crop year.

The department, which has welcomed and encouraged an upward trend in sales, has not been very vocal in opposing the bakers' demands.

The United States export the last calendar year \$8.5 billion worth in agricultural exports over imports and the surplus in the black in total balance of payments.

Secretary of Agriculture Earl L. Butz and his assistants are convinced that the credibility of the United States as a world trading partner was severely damaged in the summer of 1972 by a temporary embargo on soybean exports.

They insist that despite the bakers' objections, the country will have a crop over of about 180 million bushels of wheat in July 1.

But the bakers' objection

Most of those convinced that the bakers' objection of the American public—and income so used to prices dictated by suppliers that they were unwilling to pay more than 50¢ a bushel of wheat and 10¢ a bushel of soybeans.

But the willingness of Mr. Butz and many in the grain industry is that if a surplus is to be traded in a free world market they must pay the going price for products, even those that are raised in great surplus at home. In the case of wheat, the United States consumes only about a fifth of its annual crop; there are some obvious political risks in telling the people at home in a time of rising prices that they must bid against the rest of the world for their own grain.

Ray Davis, president of the National Association of Wheat Growers, does not believe the country is going to let wheat go, but he enthusiastically embraces the new philosophy that American consumers are going to have to pay a world price if they want their share.

Cargill, Inc., in Minneapolis, is generally acknowledged as one of the largest, if not the leading, processor and handler of United States grain products. Mr. Mike Williams, Saunders, vice president of the company's marketing and transportation group, and Marvin M. Middents, vice president for the commodity marketing division, are facing with the new world situation with a grain. It's their business and it's booming.

In 1973 Cargill

Cargill, which has annual sales in the billions, buys and sells grain 60 seconds for more than 23 per cent of United States grain output. It also processes soya beans, other products, produces feeds

and so on. It leases a fleet of ships and ships, trucks, combines, pumps and power tillage and fish-feeding boats. It has more than 800 plants and offices in 38 countries.

But Mr. Saunders and Mr. Williams, even if in conservative mood, are rep. res. entative of a more simple than that.

"Our economic situation, really, is a function," Mr. Saunders said in company headquarters in a stock market office at Lake Itasca, Minn., to get grain from surplus areas to deficit areas. There can be from Kansas City to Buffalo or to the U.S.S.R. The other is to take grain when it is in surplus and then distribute it when it is no longer in surplus. That's the grain business."

Mr. Saunders, slender, with dark wavy hair and horn-rimmed glasses, seemed to smile when the train at Mr. Saunders' headquarters friend-

"We store grain for other people," he went on. "Since World War I our biggest customer has been Uncle Sam, but we don't do much of that any more."

Both agreed that the world grain stocks were tight, but insisted that the United States would not run out of wheat.

"It's really been a shock to us," Mr. Saunders said. "We and I have been with Cargill a number of years and nobody paid any attention to our business. Now we've been on radio and television and people come to us at cocktail parties. 'Wouldn't the guys who sold all that wheat to the Russians?'"

That Russian grain deal is "the most misunderstood thing," said Mr. Middents, "but it was just the thing more than anything. Nobody predicted the dramatic turnaround."

"We thought it would happen," Mr. Saunders interjected. "But we thought it would be gradual. Nobody expected the explosion of it."

One of the things, as with energy, Mr. Middents said, "I don't want to have reasonably priced oil. But we can't take either energy or food for granted. Something's going to happen."

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
20 March 1974

Aid to poor nations favored by 68% in U.S.

By John W. Sewell

The refusal in January of the House of Representatives to authorize United States participation in the World Bank's "soft loan" program — the International Development Association (IDA) — was taken by many in Washington as one more indication that Americans would no longer support any form of foreign aid.

The vote also was seen as further evidence that the mood of the public was becoming increasingly isolationist. Now that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is about to open hearings on U.S. participation in IDA, it may be well to take a look at what Americans do think about the developing countries.

No one doubts that the mood in Washington is unfavorable to foreign aid, or indeed to any major American role in helping to solve what Robert S. McNamara calls the problems of "absolute poverty."

The annual passage of foreign-aid bills has come to resemble the "Perils of Pauline"; the legislation is constantly in peril and saved from imminent destruction only by the most incredible of feats.

But does Washington reflect the mood of the public in this case, or as in so many other cases, is Congress only an imperfect mirror of what the public actually thinks? The latter may well be the case.

Support for development is one issue on which the perceptions of the policymaker seem to be very different from the feelings of the American people.

Americans sympathetic

A recent survey published by the Overseas Development Council asked a cross section of Americans about attitudes on global development, U.S.

LONDON TIMES
14 March 1974

foreign aid and trade policies, and a range of other issues concerning world poverty and development. The results indicated that the public has not become isolationist.

Rather Americans do have a basic sympathy for the problems of the poor abroad despite the fact that most are unaware of the true dimensions of world poverty and erroneously believe that this country is spending far more in terms of relative wealth than other rich countries.

Americans consider world hunger and poverty a very serious problem. While they give higher priority to domestic poverty programs, they do not see the solution of domestic and international problems as conflicting.

Interestingly enough, the cold war no longer provides any part of the rationale for development assistance; the basic reason for the concern of Americans with the poor abroad is moral and humanitarian.

More than 68 percent of the public supports the principle of providing assistance to the poor countries; even when faced with budgetary choices, nearly 1 of every 2 Americans favors maintaining or increasing the allocation for foreign economic assistance.

Nevertheless, Americans remain to some degree skeptical about official U.S. aid, feeling that too often in the past, assistance has been wasted, tied up in red tape, or siphoned off by corrupt officials in recipient countries.

This sympathetic attitude is reflected clearly in support for private programs. Voluntary contributions to private aid programs have increased 60 percent over the past decade, the same period in which official U.S. aid has been declining.

Why this discrepancy between pub-

lic opinion and public policy? First, no channel to mobilize this sympathy now exists. In the 1950's and early 1960's, public support was mobilized by a partnership of the executive branch (which saw aid as an important tool in the cold war) and key members of Congress and private organizations who supported the program for a variety of reasons.

Real needs disregarded

Today the support of the executive branch is lukewarm. Many sympathetic congressmen and private leaders consider current American policies irrelevant to the real needs of the poor countries and are, therefore, paying more attention to domestic needs.

Second, Congress has its own perspective and, in the absence of any strong public pressure one way or the other, gives low priority to issues concerning the poor countries. The result is that both the executive and the legislative branches generally disregard the needs of the developing world.

The survey shows Americans prefer programs aimed not at gaining short-term political advantage but at alleviating such basic human problems as hunger and malnutrition, disease, illiteracy.

These, of course, are precisely the kinds of programs that IDA was designed to support. Therefore, when Congress again considers the issue of U.S. participation, it should understand that this is one case where wise public policy coincides with the wishes of the American people.

John W. Sewell is vice-president of the Overseas Development Council, a nonprofit organization concerned with the relations of the developed nations to the "third world."

Dr Kissinger's Superman image begins to crack

The omniscient as well as omnipresent image projected of Dr Henry Kissinger is beginning to look exaggerated even for such an efficient and hard-working Secretary of State. Not that it is entirely his fault. Much of the world, east as well as west, hankers for Superman. The role was thrust upon him, although presumably he did not have to be persuaded.

But the image is beginning to crack a bit, and not because the war, for the ending of which he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, continues with sporadic

ferocity. Rather it is because of animosity towards Western Europe.

His statement that the United States had its biggest problem in dealing with its friends and not its enemies was odd. His warning that in any competition with Europe Americans "are going to win because we have infinitely more resources" had a note of truculence impossible to understand.

It was not the first outburst. His displeasure was no less marked last year during the

sons that later did not bear close examination. One must assume that this animosity is a factor in European-American relations, and therefore worthy of analysis by one of the American think tanks such as RAND or the Hudson Institute. Since this is unlikely, I shall have a go.

First, the cause of his displeasure. Clearly the performance of the European Community has been disappointing, mainly because of France. The other member nations are well disposed towards the United States, as Dr Kissinger must

they are as powerless as is the United States to do anything about France, but his condemnation embraces the entire Community.

In the Middle East, the United States was an active participant. Europe was not, and can hardly be blamed for looking first to its own interests. For European countries Arab oil was vital. For the United States the embargo has proved to have been only an inconvenience.

Europe could not afford to wait for Dr Kissinger's attention, and had he not been preoccupied with other consequences of the war he could not have done anything about oil. The Arabs had the power to

turn off the taps. And the Europeans were sensible enough to recognize that reality.

At the time of writing the United States is still denied Arab oil, and little exemption is required to assess the crippling damage Europe, especially Britain, would have suffered if the Community had chosen to stand firm with Dr Kissinger. Nevertheless, Europe was represented at the Washington conference, and with the exception of France, agreed to cooperate.

This is necessarily a short review, but apart from the French attitude there is little cause for Dr Kissinger's intemperate language. So what are the possible explanations for his behaviour?

It could be jet lag or general tiredness. A man who is clearly not in good physical shape can hardly travel so much and expect to respond well to the admittedly tiresome problems of alliance politics.

Like John Foster Dulles before him, Dr Kissinger has more or less divorced himself from the State Department. Its bureaucracy can be tiresome, but it is manned by a first-class man who could profitably

be heard. Certainly there are better qualified to advise than some members of his intimate entourage.

These points cannot be denied. One has only to recall how in similar circumstances Mr. Dulles threatened Europe with a massive reappraisal and also with new assistance for the Soviet Dam. But the explanation surely lies in Dr. Kissinger's preoccupation with détente. This is understandable to some extent. The world, east and west, should be grateful, but he has become insensitive to other issues, as the New Yorker gently pointed out when discussing the expulsion of Alexander Solzhenitsyn from Russia.

The magazine observed that Mr. Solzhenitsyn's presence in the West proclaimed the moral unity of the earth and that Dr. Kissinger's career proclaimed the approaching political and economic unity of the globe. Yet when the Secretary was asked about the Russian writer he took evasive action. "We do not know enough about the specific circumstances of the departure of Mr. Solzhenitsyn," he said.

Perhaps he had spent too much time in that position, but

the Indian are not a life concern for the Germans is so great that nothing must be allowed to interfere. I have the impression that this especially applies to Europe. The Community and Nato are expected not to get in the way and to subordinate unquestioningly whatever the cost.

Dr. Kissinger expects much. Europe is not a collection of client states, and France has been provoked into further intransigence. The European countries have something to offer. After all, Herr Brandt's *Ostpolitik* achieved more than 25 years of American diplomacy did. It also made the wider German policy possible for Dr. Kissinger.

He would not accept this. He believes that since the First World War European governments have "very rarely seen fully legitimate". It is an odd belief. They may have seen weak, but they were democratically elected.

Dr. Kissinger must know that in peachment proceedings against President Nixon have been a growing possibility since the first Watergate special investigator was directed to return. In the event of impeachment, he must have had any agreement reached during

for Atlantic record term may be reversed, and that foreign governments are uneasily aware of this.

He must also know that unlike Moscow and Peking most European governments for all their diplomatic silence and dependence upon the United States, are, to say the least, reluctant to do more than is necessary until legitimacy in Washington is seen to have been established.

Dr. Hagerman must be congratulated for carrying out as Ellen says, the Good were still in the White House and a way with the world. His ambition to achieve better must be applauded, but hardly anyone who antisocial towards Europe and at a time when the United States moved forward, even his despise Europeans.

The point was made by *FT New York Times* yesterday when it chastised the "allowing the differences between the United States and Common Market allies to exacerbated in a verb brawl. . . . European policymakers' new articles has every right to remind that require no lessons in 'leg istry' from the Administration." Mr. Kissinger, however,

CONFIDENTIAL

JAPAN TIMES
15 March 1974

Worldwide Options Available

India Being Urged to Increase Production for Medical Use

By ANTHONY MARRO
New York

WASHINGTON — The U.S. Government — which is paying Turkey \$25 million to ban the growing of opium poppies — has been quietly urging India to increase its opium production.

The reason: The Turkish opium ban, which drug officials say has helped reduce the flow of heroin into this country, also has caused serious shortages of opium needed for medical uses, such as the production of morphine and codeine.

"In case you haven't heard," said one Government official, "There's now a worldwide opium shortage."

Two Administration officials confirmed recently that the U.S. has approached India, the world's largest producer of legal opium, through "normal diplomatic channels" in an attempt to head-off an opium shortage. Both said that this was not as much of a contradiction of its Turkish policy as it might appear.

They said that Turkey, where the U.S. is anxious to keep the opium ban in effect, had been the source of 75 to 80 per cent of the illegal heroin that found its way into the U.S. Little, if any, Indian opium ever reached this country through the black market, they said.

Because of this, the Nixon Administration would prefer to obtain medicinal opium from India, rather than have opium growing resume in Turkey.

A 1972 report by President Nixon's Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control showed India was the world's largest producer of legal opium, with an estimated total production of 843 metric tons in 1971, compared with an estimated 160 metric tons produced in Turkey.

- Terrell, C. 1933

The report went on to note that while the bulk of heroin used by American addicts had come from Turkish opium it had been refined in French heroin labs, "most" "of production . . . is consumed in the general region where it is produced."

One of the sources said State Department officials had contacted the Indian Government within the past six months and urged that opium production be increased to meet medical needs.

The second source, however, indicated that there had been a more cautious approach. "I don't think they just asked the

Indians to increase production," he said. "I think they indicated that there would be a market for anything they could produce, but stressed that we wouldn't want any increase if there was a danger of it being diverted into the illicit market."

Asked what the Indian Government's response has been, he said: "The Indians are receptive to any plans for economic development." A spokesman at the Indian Embassy in Washington said that he could not confirm the U.S. move. "These consultations, if any, had taken place in Delhi," the spokesman said. "Frankly, we are not in the picture on this at the embassy."

India's Population

A non-Government source, an attorney for a drug processing firm, also said that the State Department had urged India to increase production. "It's all beer done quickly and diplomatically," the attorney said. "With a very definite theme because they've had a fall in the market to grow opium, while saying the Indians are too poor to produce it."

The Turkish ban went into effect

lost over the 1981 harvest, a — according to officials at the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration — had an almost immediate impact. They say it has been at least partly responsible for the heroin shortage they believe exists along the east coast.

The law also had an almost immediate effect on legitimate drug firms. It left India with virtual monopoly as a seller for opium, and India could meet the demands of Britain, Western Europe and North America.

By last December, the shipping of gun powder was increased and coal and coke was purchased in large quantities. It was estimated that the Government Chemical Works of St. Louis, Mo. and S. B. Penick & Co. of New York -- purchased Congress and the Government had more of shipping from the defense companies of Port Newark, N. J.

"This eased the domestic shortage, and brought the companies back to the fact that a long range solution depended on their obtaining an opinion from India."

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The Administration sources said the U.S. is hoping to persuade India and other poppy-growing nations to convert to a "poppy straw" method of cultivation. This could result in more morphine for medical uses, with less risk of its being diverted into the illicit market.

The traditional method is to obtain opium gum by slicing into a poppy bulb with a sharp knife and allowing the gum to ooze out and dry. The gum is then scraped off the bulb and refined into morphine base.

In the "poppy straw" method, however, no opium gum is collected. The poppy plants are allowed to mature instead, and then are cut like hay and carted off in bales to a processing plant, where morphine — not opium — is extracted from the stalks.

The Administration believes that this processing method could be more tightly controlled. The problem, the sources say, is that India and most other poppy-growing countries do not yet have the technology to do it economically, and, in the short run, could increase production only by growing more poppies and harvesting gum in the traditional way.

Another problem for the Administration is that the new Turkish Government recently told U.S. Ambassador William Macomber that it wants to reopen discussions on the 1971 U.S.-Turkey agreement that led to the opium ban. Some Government sources believe the Turks may want to revoke the ban now, or at least want more money from the U.S. to keep it in effect.

NEW YORK TIMES
18 March 1974

TURKEY IS PRESSED OVER OPIUM CURB

U.S. Seeks Continued Ban on Poppy Cultivation

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 17—United States officials say they hope to persuade Turkey to continue her 32-month-old ban on the cultivation of the opium poppy, but the feeling in Washington is that Ankara's decision will probably be based on internal Turkish political pressures.

Last week the Turkish Ambassador here, Melih Esenbel, met with State Department of-

ficials to discuss his country's desire to resume cultivation of the opium poppy, from which heroin is derived. A State Department official reported that the Ambassador had given assurances that do decision had been made yet and that even if the ban were lifted, no plantings would be undertaken before the fall season.

That means the poppy crop would not be harvested until June, 1975.

United States officials here indicated that they would be trying hard to convince Turkey to continue the ban. And two New York Congressmen, Representatives Lester L. Wolff of Nassau and Charles B. Rangel of Manhattan, arrived in Ankara on Thursday to press the United States position.

\$35-Million in Aid

Turkey ordered the ban on

poppy growing in July, 1971, in exchange for \$35-million in United States aid. The aid was to compensate the Turkish Government for legitimate export losses and to develop programs to replace the income lost by the farmers.

But elections in Turkey last October resulted in a new Government that pledged to end the ban. The ban had been unpopular with the farmers because of their economic losses and among others for nationalistic reasons. Moreover, parts of the poppy provided the farmer with oil for cooking and feed for livestock.

A State Department official said that he did not know what the United States would do if Turkey resumed cultivation. Although other measures are being considered to block trafficking in opium, he said, if it

But in fact the growers made major sales to drug traffickers.

The two parties which make up Turkey's new ruling coalition — the Republican People's Party and the National Salvation Party — promised in last October's elections to lift the ban on opium growing. Most Turks do not see why their farmers should bear sacrifices because of the drug problem in another country, the more so since there is no drug addiction in Turkey itself, and Turkish laws are very severe on drug smugglers. —

If Turkey goes ahead and authorizes the planting of the opium poppy again this spring, the U.S. must make the best of this unfortunate decision, and press for enforcement of strict security measures with the goal of ensuring that the entire crop is handed over to the government and none hidden away for the sale to traffickers. But admittedly it is not easy for the Turkish authorities to keep a tight check on all that goes on in the remote Anatolian hills where the poppy growers live.

is grown in Turkey some if it is found to reach the black market.

Half of Aid Unpaid

The official added that other nations, including Britain, Canada, West Germany, France, Sweden, and Iran, were also trying to persuade Turkey to continue the ban.

He said that he did not know what would happen to the unpaid balance of the \$35-million in American aid if opium growing resumes. Only \$15 million has been paid to Turkey so far.

The official also noted that reports last week erroneously stated that Turkey had already decided to resume opium growing. He said that the Turkish Government had only begun to permit production of seeds for possible future use.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
12 March 1974

Turkey and the opium poppy

The United States has good reason to be concerned over the new Turkish government's intention to lift the ban on cultivating the opium poppy.

The ban was imposed in 1971 under strong U.S. pressure. Before then American narcotics agents estimated that 80 percent of the raw heroin reaching the U.S. had its origin in Turkey. In the past two years, however, there has been a significant decline in the amount of heroin smuggled into the U.S.

Under the 1971 agreement the U.S. undertook to compensate Turkish farmers for the loss of their opium crop to the tune of \$35.7 million. The financial aid was intended to help the farmers convert to other crops, and also to encourage regional development. But the farmers complain that this aid has not reached them.

Some 100,000 farming families in four provinces are involved. Previously their opium was theoretically sold to the government for export for medicinal purposes.

Eastern Europe

NEW YORK TIMES
10 March 1974

An Approach to Détente, Trade and

By Marshall D. Shulman

The United States is approaching a choice in the next few weeks about whether economic relations with the Soviet Union should be developed or discouraged. The forthcoming Senate debate on the Trade Reform Act, with its proposed amendment to prohibit credits and normal tariff status to the Soviet Union unless that country permits free emigration, will have an important effect on the future course of Soviet-American relations.

Unfortunately, the debate has become polarized between equally unrealistic extremes. On one side is a strange alliance between conservatives who have consistently opposed a reduction of tensions in Soviet-American relations, and liberals who are reacting to the collapse of their too-high expectations for friendly relations with a liberalized Soviet regime.

On the other are enthusiasts from the business community who are fascinated by vast new opportunities in Eastern Europe, and who see trade as the universal solvent of international conflicts.

The choice appears to be between morality with continued high tension and détente with trade.

It is not surprising that the course of recovery from 25 years of the cold war should be full of zigzags, particularly when the bearhugs and champagne toasts between President Nixon and Leonid I. Brezhnev have been overdramatized as the symbols of a new "structure of peace." But we should understand, if we must use the word "détente" (and it is probably inevitable, for there is no other headline-sized word to describe the present mixture of competition and restraint) that détente is a process that may, at best, develop from stage one, where we are now, through the decades to stages two, three, and beyond.

Stage one, or limited détente, means neither less nor more than the partial codification of the terms of competition. It does not yet mean that the rivalry is over, that the two societies have common goals or values, or that we approve of each other.

The main business of stage one is to reduce the danger of nuclear war, by damping down the military compe-

tition and by encouraging restraints in the continuing competition between the two countries. We should not forget that unless this objective is realized all other objectives lose their meaning.

The development of economic relations with the Soviet Union is an important secondary aspect of the limited détente. Among the most important Soviet motivations for seeking to reduce tension is the strong desire for trade, technology and investment from abroad.

Clearly we should neither slam the door on the trade agreement negotiated in 1972 (as we would do by passing the restrictive amendment as it is now worded) nor open the door wide to a sudden expansion of trade and investment with unrestricted Government-sponsored credits.

A more sensible response at this early stage of our emergence from the cold war would be a modest and controlled development of economic relations, largely in consumer goods and machinery, with the prospect of a gradual increase over a fifteen- or twenty-year period involving an increasing mix of advanced technology and investment in resource-development.

This would serve to offer a continuing incentive to the Soviet leaders to accept the constraints of a low-tension policy, but could be regulated to insure that our resources are not used to strengthen Soviet military capabilities and that the political competition is conducted with restraint.

This would require that the Administration have the will and the means for coordinating and controlling credits and the transfer of technology on the basis of a national policy, and that the matter should not be determined by the separate actions of individual companies on the basis of the profitability of these transactions to them.

Our policy should be determined not by arguments about profits, jobs, balance of payments or the loss of trade to other countries, nor by illusions that trade will democratize the Soviet Union, but by the hardheaded awareness that economic motivation can provide a continuing incentive to constrain the terms of competition, and that it is in our interest to do so.

Human Rights

What about human rights, including the Jewish emigration? That the Soviet system of political control is not able to coexist with freedom of inquiry and with intellectual and artistic creativity should come as no surprise, nor the present convulsive tightening of controls by the hardliners and the Soviet police apparatus, who fear the effects of prolonged low tension.

But there are also many forces for change in the Soviet Union, not only among the handful of articulate and courageous dissidents, but by persons in a spectrum of positions within the system who are seeking to rid themselves of atavistic methods and cumbersome bureaucracy.

The condition favorable to the evolution they seek is a prolonged period of reduced tension, with the sympathetic attention and support of world public opinion.

Public pressures in this direction combined with private diplomacy can be more effective than frontal demands upon the Soviet leadership by our Government, whether our executive or the legislative branch.

The restrictive trade amendment has the character of an ultimatum demanding unrealizable conditions, which will inevitably generate forces of resistance in the Soviet political leadership and will be counterproductive.

If therefore the Senate situation is such that the restrictive amendment is inevitable, that measure should at least be cast in less uncompromising language designed to encourage the objective of easing arbitrary discrimination and harassment of those who wish to emigrate, and should put discretionary authority in the hands of the President to administer the provision with some flexibility.

The present alternative leads toward a return to the tensions of the cold war, which would not only increase the danger of war but would preserve the basis for controlled mobilization in the Soviet Union and diminish the prospect for that evolution that we and many people in the Soviet Union ardently desire.

Marshall D. Shulman is Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Relations and director of the Russian Institute at Columbia University.

Western Europe

BALTIMORE SUN
20 March 1974

Snags for the European Community

By DAVID FOUQUET

Brussels.

A year ago the European Economic Community had just been enlarged and had embarked on an ambitious journey toward full integration. A musical and artistic "fanfare for Europe" was providing the cultural accompaniment for the city's new task.

A year later the European dream has turned into a nightmare of uncertainty and indecision and a "funeral dirge" would be more appropriate background music.

The intervening period has been marked by acrimonious bickering, missed deadlines, external pressures and deteriorating economic and political conditions in most of the EEC member countries. All this has paralyzed the Community's already sluggish decision-making process and caused many to doubt whether the enterprise can survive. Whereas many dedicated Europeans in the past had been saying that there could be no going back in the construction of Europe, the top Eurocrat recently observed that "there is nothing preordained about Europe; there is no point of no return." And some of the recently arrived British civil servants are beginning to cast about for other jobs.

This time disappointed Europeans cannot engage in a convenient binge of "frog bashing" and blame French obstructionism as usual. This time there is a lot of blame to go around.

France did deal the Community goal of economic and monetary union a crippling blow by withdrawing from the EEC common currency float. And it has long stymied numerous other Community decisions ranging from formulation of an energy policy to strengthening the European Parliament. But then there

was also the obstinacy of Germany in rejecting a large regional development fund for the Community's underdeveloped areas.

Bonn, which in the past had been characterized as "very generous" in funding EEC programs, has expressed a weariness at "playing the paymaster." This led to a clash with the British Heath government, which desperately needed a large regional pork-barrel program to bail it out economically and politically. Since it couldn't obtain the funding, it sought for the regional program, Britain blocked decisions in other areas.

As a result, the Community has come to a virtual standstill in recent months. Even commitments solemnly made by the European heads of state in a December summit meeting in Copenhagen have been largely ignored. If this weren't enough, the Community now faces the uncertainty of a new British government, led by a party that vowed to renegotiate the terms of British entry into the Community. Knowledgeable officials in Brussels forecast that the British situation will further paralyze the Community for at least a year, while the new regime sorts out its policy, while the Community concentrates on this problem and probably until new British elections are held.

Internal preoccupations aren't the only thing endangering the Europeans. Just as important are the nature of the Community's relations with its former supporter and mentor across the Atlantic. "The Year of Europe," which was supposed to resolve problems between Europe and the United States actually created more. Instead of merely having to deal with economic and commercial controversies, the two are now confronted with more serious

questions of security and political trust.

Henry Kissinger, who has displayed such finesse in dealing with opponents and explosive situations, has shown only spotty results in patching up relations with Europe. His call for a Year of Europe and a new Atlantic Charter was judged to have been ill-prepared and badly timed from this side of the ocean. The situation was aggravated even further during the Middle East war and the ensuing energy disruption.

His convening of the Washington energy conference served to isolate France in stubborn opposition while gaining the support of the rest of the European Community. However, it had a catastrophic impact on Community tempers and relations. French Foreign Minister Michel Jobert was moved to attack his European colleagues to the point that one Eurocrat in Brussels observed that "his attacks were so wounding that I don't see how they can work together in the future."

There are even those in Brussels who feel that Mr. Kissinger, having glimpsed that a united Europe could no longer be controlled by the United States, has decided to limit its development to a commercial group.

Belgian Jean Rey, a former European commission president who has never been accused of being anti-American, recently observed "Henry Kissinger doesn't like the Europeans, that's a fact. Unlike many American leaders, he doesn't understand the Community. He has never displayed interest or sympathy in it and he considers it like a foreign body in the Atlantic Alliance. Only the Alliance interests him and, at the heart of this, the American leadership." Many non-French Europeans, no less than Latin Americans at the recent hemispheric

meeting, are suspicious of U.S. hegemony.

This has been the French thesis which, rightly or wrongly, is being looked at more closely as a result of Mr. Kissinger's recent tirade against the European failure to consult before deciding to seek a conference between European and Arab countries. The fact is that German Foreign Minister Walter Scheel discussed the matter with Kissinger before it was decided. This has led some Europeans here to wonder whether in Mr. Kissinger's vocabulary "consultation" is not synonymous with "U.S. veto."

If Mr. Kissinger feels that Herr Scheel's consulting style was inadequate, he may be in for further disappointment in the latter half of 1974, when France and Michel Jobert take over the rotating presidency of the EEC.

It is no wonder that with so many internal and external controversies and pressures besetting the Community, its gravediggers are becoming legion. The only thing certain at the moment is that its customs union and other economic programs are still functioning and will continue to exist precariously. However, so many promises have been broken concerning greater economic and political unity that no one would want to predict a resounding success for the future.

Despite all the uncertainty, at least one Community official isn't panicking. "Just remember," he remarked recently, "in the 1930's, more than one-hundred years after the end of the Congress of Vienna, there were still bureaucrats attending to the cleaning up."

Mr. Fouquet is a freelance journalist living in Brussels.

NEW YORK TIMES
18 March 1974

Atlantic Asperity

President Nixon's outburst in Chicago against the European allies makes it clear that serious difficulties have again overtaken Secretary of State Kissinger's year-long flickering effort to reinvigorate the Atlantic Alliance and establish a "special relationship" with the nine-nation Common Market. The vehemence with which Mr. Nixon wielded his bludgeon was apparently designed to pave the way for yesterday's disclosure that he has decided to defer his projected April visit to those allies in Europe.

Concealed behind all the rhetoric, there is one embarrassing fact. Mr. Nixon has been trying fruitlessly for

a year to obtain an invitation from the European Economic Community (E.E.C.) to meet formally with its nine chiefs of government in Brussels during his European tour. The idea, originally suggested by West German Chancellor Brandt, has been blocked by France.

It is agreed that there would be a summit-level meeting of the fifteen-member NATO Council. Its purpose would be to sign a declaration of common purpose in defense. But there is no agreement on who will attend the signing of a second joint declaration covering political and economic cooperation between the United States and the Common Market, which has just been redrafted by the Europeans. The nature of the meeting to conclude this document is the primary cause of delay in scheduling

President Nixon's trip, rather than such differences over the text as the American desire and French refusal to speak of "partnership."

The United States wants Mr. Nixon to meet with the nine E.E.C. chiefs of government even if, as France insists, the document is signed on behalf of the Common Market Council by its President, a post that will be occupied by Chancellor Brandt until the end of June. But President Pompidou has refused to agree even to an informal dinner meeting with the Nine, lest a precedent be set for an institutional link with the United States. He wants a single spokesman to represent the Common Market in consultation with the United States. Otherwise, as he sees it, nine relative dwarfs would be meeting with the American dominant giant.

* * *

The American view is that improved procedures for European-American consultation are essential if joint policies are to be achieved for solving mutual problems. At present, Mr. Kissinger has charged, the E.E.C. countries are precluded from consulting with the United States until a common policy is shaped, after which "Europe appoints a spokesman who is empowered to inform us of the decisions taken but has no authority to negotiate."

It was this issue that prompted Mr. Kissinger's rancorous protest early this month against the decision of the E.E.C. countries to meet separately with the Arabs.

NEW YORK TIMES

16 March 1974

United States and France

By C. L. Sulzberger

PARIS—The petulance now featuring United States relationships with France is ridiculous and unnecessary. From certain remarks attributed to Henry Kissinger one must conclude he should never be indiscreet in private, which he now inferentially acknowledges. It is one thing to use the calculated public leak for policy purposes but it is quite another to blow off steam and have it surface in a cloud of embarrassment.

Mr. Kissinger was quoted in a pro-American London paper Feb. 10 as having told a small group that Europeans are "craven," "contemptible," "pernicious" and acting like "jackals," to say nothing of appraising Saudi Arabia's King Faisal as a "religious fanatic," which neither helped prospects of trans-Atlantic amity nor facilitated easement of the anti-U.S. oil embargo.

On March 6, the normally pro-American Paris *Figaro* reported the Secretary of State as saying the United States knew better how to choose enemies than friends and it was easier to treat with the former than the latter. These alleged opinions, added to those publicly enunciated, raised hackles.

One result is that recent U.S. policy has proved counterproductive. The Washington petroleum consumers meeting, at which France was the odd-man-out, was swiftly superseded by a European Community policy that excluded America. And French Foreign Minister Michel Jobert, who admires Mr. Kissinger's person more than his current views, has recently taken to rubbing mustard into U.S. irritations.

It is even reported that Washington has begun re-examining policy toward

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

France, which I take to be nonsense since things are certainly in no more critical state between the two countries than frequently in the past and it would be folly to heat up the situation.

Mr. Kissinger has for years been pro-French and a considerable admirer of Gaullism, the philosophy represented today by President Pompidou and Mr. Jobert. Indeed, Mr. Kissinger—then a Democrat—had been brought into the Kennedy Administration early as an adviser on nuclear strategy and European matters.

He was often used as a secret messenger between President Kennedy and Chancellor Adenauer, an ardent Gaullist and Francophile, and once was dispatched by the former "to find out what's gone wrong with our German policy." Mr. Kissinger replied: "That will be easier if you'll tell me one small thing: What is our German policy?"

The present Secretary of State broke with Mr. Kennedy over France, especially on the question of de Gaulle's so-called *force de frappe*. He argued there was absolutely no escaping the existence of a French national atomic force. Subsequently, he became a Republican policy expert, first for Nelson Rockefeller, then Mr. Nixon.

Now, one might ask, just what is our French policy as applied by the man who seemed an early U.S. Gaullist and in the name of that avowed admirer of the General and friend of Pompidou, Richard Nixon? The answer is, things will probably simmer down and our policy is already seeking to

Actually, few major decisions are taken by the E.E.C. without lengthy argument in public view among the nine governments. The United States has only itself to blame if it fails to lobby effectively for its interests.

France's eight Common Market partners did wisely agree in Washington in February to act jointly with the United States on the critical oil problem, despite Paris's refusal to participate. Under those circumstances they could not risk further divisions in the E.E.C. by flatly rejecting the Arab contacts Paris proposed. Moreover, responding to President Nixon's letter this month protesting "rival activity" in the Middle East, Chancellor Brandt made it clear—as representative of the Nine—that he would move slowly, in consultation with Washington, and would seek to provide "flanking support" for American political and oil efforts in the Middle East.

These reassurances make incomprehensible President Nixon's Chicago accusations of "hostility" and "confrontation" on the part of the Nine. His criticism of the new draft of the projected joint declaration—and his refusal to set a date for his European trip until agreement on its terms is reached—can be defended as efforts to assure a summit meeting with the Common Market, with or without France. But his warning that substantial numbers of American troops might be withdrawn from Europe unless the E.E.C. comes to heel on political and economic issues, can only be self-defeating.

calm the situation, not exacerbate it.

Mr. Kissinger certainly knows that foreign policy for one country means internal policy for another. Thus Mr. Nixon has been accused of seeking political coups abroad to strengthen his sagging situation at home. Likewise, with Mr. Pompidou in Soviet Russia this week, it was reasonable to expect his journey to be preceded by a dash of French nationalism at American expense.

Now that the French President is home one can anticipate a switchback, even if he isn't going to change his mind on dealing with the energy crisis, a subject viewed differently in fuel-poor France than in fuel-rich America. But the old French-American friendships retains plenty of vitality.

In 1965 de Gaulle received Hubert Humphrey and told me afterward: "You know, in our conversation, Vice President Humphrey and I were in agreement on this point—our countries, the United States and France, have often been in disagreement over the last two centuries. Certainly we were not in agreement over Mexico one hundred years ago."

"And from 1914 to 1917 the United States had relations with Germany while we were at war. After the Versailles Treaty, the United States failed to join in the League of Nations and opposed reparations for France. In 1940 the United States was not ready to go to war to protect France and England."

"We have often been in disagreement and Humphrey shared my view that it doesn't matter. Despite our differences, our two nations have always remained friends, naturally and spontaneously. I see no reason why this should not continue."

WASHINGTON POST
19 March 1974

Joseph Kraft

A Foreign Policy Showdown

Why did President Nixon take a gratuitous shot at the European allies in his Chicago appearance last week? And why, for the previous 10 days, did Henry Kissinger knock the allies in statements to newsmen, senators and even congressional wives?

The answer is that the President and the Secretary of State are provoking a showdown in order to force the allies, once and for all, on to the road of Atlantic partnership with this country. In the bargain, the allies would be put on the defensive and therefore unable to upset ongoing negotiations in the Mideast and with the Soviet Union. Which is very nice, except that the bold move is apt to backfire with adverse consequences both abroad and in the United States.

Behind all this is the slow, unsteady progress toward political unity which Europe has been making following the entry of Britain into the Common Market last year. The French have been using the process to build a Gaullist Europe—divorced from the United States. They have insisted on policy stands hostile to American interests in the Mideast, and on a procedure which forbids consultation with Washington until decisions are taken.

Most of the other European countries, and especially West Germany, want to stick close to the United States. So while going along with France on procedural questions, they have tried to cooperate with the United States on practical matters. In fact, during the past year there has been a rare degree of harmony between Washington and the European allies on such substantive business as

trade, exchange rates and defense.

Practical cooperation on specific problems has not been good enough for the President and the Secretary of State. A year ago, in a speech which spoke of the Year of Europe, Dr. Kissinger called for an Atlantic dialogue to foster agreement at the highest levels on a joint statement of basic principles.

As predicted here and elsewhere, the dialogue resulted only in a highly generalized statement. Moreover Dr. Kissinger was furious when the Europeans, last fall, prepared a draft statement and presented it to the United States without previous consultation, as an accomplished fact.

The consultation issue erupted again as a result of Dr. Kissinger's efforts to organize cooperation with the allies on the energy question. At the Washington energy conference last month, he did prevail on eight of the European countries to agree to work jointly with the United States in dealing with problems growing out of the energy crisis. France, which opposed any cooperation, was left isolated.

But the French made a slight comeback by prevailing upon the other European countries, on March 4, to agree to a forthcoming meeting with Arab leaders from which the United States would be excluded. Once again, moreover, Dr. Kissinger felt that he was presented with a decision by the Europeans without serious advance consultation.

Immediately thereafter, Dr. Kissinger began loosing against the Europeans what the Economist of London called "Henry's Thunderbolts." The President then piled it on in Chicago

by indicating this country would withdraw troops from Europe if the allies did not cooperate more in political and economic issues.

Both men have a point. The habit of non-consultation is bad. Unless checked soon, it could harden over the years so that eventually the United States and Europe would drift apart on all major issues.

Moreover, the occasion is not necessarily bad for a showdown. The French are uncomfortable in their isolation—hence the relatively conciliatory speech over the weekend by Foreign Minister Michel Jobert. The socialist governments in Germany and Britain are defensive about relations with the United States, and under strong internal pressure to appease Washington. If nothing else, tough talk now will prevent the Europeans from opposing the negotiations Dr. Kissinger now has under way in the Mideast and with the Soviet Union.

At bottom, however, I think the President and Dr. Kissinger are playing with fire. Advance consultation is not all that important—and they know it better than anybody. No present government, not excluding the Nixon government, is strong enough to make binding commitments about the future of Atlantic partnership.

By forcing a conflict now, practical cooperation on specific issues is made more difficult. Worst of all, by raising the troop question, Mr. Nixon is only playing into the hands of those in this country who want to withdraw troops as a first step in an overall thinning of relations with Europe.

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THE NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, MARCH 10, 1974

A Postage Stamp Raises West German Tempers

A Communist Executed in 1919 Is Commemorated

By CRAIG R. WHITNEY
Special to The New York Times

BONN, March 8—Rosa Luxemburg, the "Red Rosa" who was executed in Berlin 55 years ago for her revolutionary activities, is raising political tempers in Germany again through that most conservative of institutions, the Post Office.

Since Jan. 15, she has been commemorated on the German equivalent of the 10-cent stamp.

Although the basic color of the stamp is orange, not red, and Rosa Luxemburg is portrayed in black, many Germans who think Chancellor Willy Brandt's Social Democratic party is crypto-Communist anyway took one look when it came out and

said "Aha!"

The threat, whether real or imagined, of "radicals" infiltrating the Government through the Social Democrats is a subject of constant discussion here, and to many it seemed to become real again when 30 million of the 40-pfennig commemorative stamps were printed late last year.

"We've never had a stamp so many people refuse to take at the counter," said the Postmaster General, Horst Ehmke. "But we've printed them, and we'll sell them." A press spokesman for his ministry said, however, that the 30 million stamps, normally enough to last for six months, would probably be sold out in five.

One reason may be that buying a Rosa Luxemburg stamp is a way for those Germans—especially younger ones—who have leftist-liberal political views to show them, without necessarily making

a real political commitment.

But it is not popular only among Germans. An American lawyer at the anti-establishment Lawyers Military Defense Committee in Heidelberg put a Rosa Luxemburg stamp on a letter to a United States Army colonel the other day and said, "We do it on purpose—it ought to make them mad." The committee helps defend soldiers in mainly political cases here.

2,000 Protest Letters

Mr. Ehmke has received about 2,000 protest letters, in which themes such as "Bonn now takes orders from the Kremlin" seem to predominate. He countered with one of Rosa Luxemburg's own quotations: "Freedom means the freedom to disagree."

Rosa Luxemburg was summarily executed on Jan. 15, 1919, after the failure of the Communist uprising in Berlin. Before she founded the

Spartacist Union with Karl Liebknecht in 1917, she belonged to the left wing of the Social Democratic party.

Near East

THE WASHINGTON POST

Friday, March 8, 1974

Anti-U.S. Tempest Stirs India

By Lewis M. Simons

NEW DELHI, March 7—With Secretary of State Henry Kissinger expected to visit New Delhi in the next few weeks, the government of India is struggling to hold the lid on an anti-American tempest brewing in a teapot.

The flap, brought up by leftist members of Parliament, concerns U.S. plans to develop its air and naval support facilities on the tiny Indian Ocean atoll of Diego Garcia.

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and her government are anxiously trying to let the United States know in advance of Kissinger's trip that while they are opposed to a major power buildup in the Indian Ocean, they are not overly upset with the Pentagon's plans for Diego Garcia.

The government fears that if the pot boils over before Kissinger arrives, hoped-for discussions on strengthening Indo-American trade and economic cooperation — and possibly resuming some form of U.S. aid — will suffer.

But Communist and other left-wing legislators are refusing to play along. Today and yesterday they forced Foreign Minister Swaran Singh to declare before Parliament that India was as resolutely as ever against a major U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean.

The opposition members were using a remark made on Monday by U.S. Ambassador Daniel Patrick Moynihan to press their point. During a meeting with Indian journalists in the southern city of Madras, Moynihan reportedly said that U.S. interests in Diego Garcia were "more important" than those of India, which has no "fundamental concern" in the island, located 1,200 miles south of the Indian coast.

Most New Delhi newspapers ran the story on their front pages. Moynihan was deeply angered, claiming that he and the newsmen had agreed that the remarks were not to be attributed to him.

Communist parliamentari-

ans jumped on the reports and one even demanded that Moynihan be declared persona non grata and ejected from India.

Swaran Singh prevented that but reiterated that the U.S. plan to spend \$29 million on expanding the Diego Garcia facility was contrary to India's aim of making the Indian Ocean a "zone of peace."

Singh's statements reflect India's dilemma. As a prime mover in the nonaligned movement and the major power in south Asia, it must argue against a U.S.-Soviet arms race in the region. But the Indians must also temper their public protestations with private assurances to the United States at a time when relations between the two are gradually improving.

Senior Indian government officials make the point privately that they are prepared to live with an increased number of U.S. Navy ships, submarines and aircraft moving in and out of Diego Garcia.

"We're not anti-anybody on this," a ranking government source said, "and we want the United States to know that. But India, and all the countries on the Indian Ocean for that matter, are committed to making it a zone of peace."

U.S. observers say Indian officials are restrained because they realize that turning Diego Garcia into an important staging base cannot be construed as aiding Pakistan — India's constant and overriding defense worry.

"Our hands-off policy on arms for Pakistan is finally sinking in," one American observer said. "It's beginning to look like the Indians finally believe we mean what we say."

Diplomatic reaction to the expansion plans for Diego Garcia has been low key. U.S. and British diplomats were not even summoned to the Foreign Ministry, a standard procedure when a government wants to register a complaint. Britain, which owns the 5,700-acre, coral island, recently agreed to allow the United States to expand its facilities there.

Some observers believe that if the Kissinger visit, which is expected sometime before the middle of April, produces little or nothing concrete, India may shift its stand and launch a full-scale diplomatic attack on the United States.

But the Indians do not appear to expect Kissinger to arrive with a sack of goodies. The mere fact that he is coming for the first time since taking office and will spend a couple of days talking to Mrs. Gandhi and others is considered important.

BALTIMORE SUN
18 March 1974

Moynihan, McNamara under attack in India

By PRAN SAEERWAL
New Delhi Bureau of The Sun

New Delhi — Ambassador Daniel Patrick Moynihan and the World Bank president, Robert S. McNamara, are under attack in India despite their efforts to help overcome the country's worst economic crisis.

Both are being criticized in Parliament for their candid, but private, comments.

Mr. Moynihan was criticized for his background interview with newspaper reporters, in which he said that the Indian Ocean base being built by the United States on the British-held island of Diego Garcia was more important to U.S. interests than to India's. He also commented, "Why call it the Indian Ocean? One may as well call it Madagascar Sea."

The pro-Moscow Communist party criticized Mr. Moynihan's observation, condemned him and his government's "sinister moves" in the Indian Ocean and called for his expulsion.

Given special attention

All the recent efforts by the American Ambassador to repair Indo-U.S. relations, increase bilateral trade and economic co-operation and the writing off of India's debt in rupees was of little consequence when it came to attacking him on the Indian Ocean base.

In the last six years, since Mr. McNamara became the chief of the World Bank, he has singled out India for spe-

cial attention, pumping in funds to help the country.

Two-thirds of all the soft lending of the International Development Agency, an associate of the World Bank, was given to India.

When President Nixon cut off all economic assistance to India in 1971 because of the Indo-Pakistan war, Mr. McNamara continued assistance to India, despite the fact that the U.S. is the major contributor to the World Bank.

The crime of Mr. McNamara, according to pro-Moscow Communists and others — including members of the ruling Congress party, is leakage of the World Bank report on the Indian economy in Washington which has some very gloomy predictions about the country's future and questions the Indian economic assessments.

The "leak," according to the critics, was deliberate and had "sinister motives" of running down India, the World Bank acting on behalf of American imperialism, was trying to pressure India to give up all efforts at becoming self-reliant, critics charged yesterday in Parliament.

The attack is on U.S. motives. Leftists fear that the resumption of American aid would hurt Soviet influence here. The rightists, on the other hand, are complaining that the United States is not doing enough.

Far East

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
8 March 1974

'Phantom Army' of Cambodia still marches

By Daniel Southard
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Phnom Penh, Cambodia

The United States has managed to get Cambodian Army officers to make significant reductions in the number of "phantom" soldiers on their payrolls, but the practice of collecting money for nonexistent soldiers is far from ended.

In January of last year, the Cambodian command claimed an Army strength of 800,000 men. But everyone knew that the Army did not have this many soldiers and that officers were pocketing the pay of a large number of ghost, or phantom, soldiers.

The United States refused to support a payroll of more than 200,000 men, and the figure was subsequently set at about 200,000. At the same time, a new centralized payroll system was introduced. Eventually this system is to be computerized.

At first, expansion

The origins of the phantom-soldier

payoffs go back to the beginning of the war in Cambodia.

When the war erupted nearly four years ago, the Army consisted of only about 30,000 men. It had to expand rapidly, and battalion commanders were authorized to recruit for their own units.

As a result, a decentralized and corruption-ridden system of paying the troops emerged, with battalion, brigade and division commanders making sizeable profits. Reports of the situation created a stir in the U.S. Congress, and at one point a Cambodian Cabinet official candidly admitted that there might be as many as 100,000 phantom troops.

Under the new system, pay committees sent out from the central level have taken over the function of paying the troops. Theoretically, this ought to eliminate the phantom problem.

Salaries 'too low'

But as one high-ranking Cambodian Army officer explained to this reporter, the average officer cannot get by on his official salary.

on the payroll

This officer said that he elicits 20 phantoms to each of his battalion commanders. This allows the battalion commander enough extra money — about 140,000 riels, or about \$230 a month — to pay his expenses, send his children to school, and rent a house for his family in Phnom Penh.

The officer said that he thought this was "reasonable" compensation for men who are expected to fight a long war on low salaries.

What about complaints?

But what if the paymasters objected to this, the officer was asked.

"There are ways of threatening them," he replied.

The officer said that the problem was to prevent those who were profiting from the phantom system from being too greedy. He acknowledged that sharp reductions had been made in the total number of phantoms but said that the problem could never be entirely eliminated.

WASHINGTON POST
13 March 1974

Legal Help to Cambodians

American Advises in Combat

By Elizabeth Becker
Special to The Washington Post

KAMPOT, Cambodia—During the dark hours of dawn the Cambodian insurgents were lobbing mortars around the government's command post at Kampot. Inside, U.S. Maj. Lawrence W. Onderker was showing the Cambodian officers how to mount a counterattack.

"I want you to respond very quickly he said. 'If even one mortar falls in your zone, you must answer back with fire immediately.'"

While the American major was poring over maps with the Cambodian staff officers, the Cambodian general officially in command of the post was writing in his diary, alone in an adjoining bunker.

The U.S. embassy in Phnom Penh has repeatedly denied reports that Americans are serving as military advisers in the field. Congress has passed a law that prohibits the U.S. mission here from direct involvement in the conduct of the war.

But the situation in this

coastal town about 30 miles south of Phnom Penh is critical, and Maj. Onderker was flown down Sunday. "He was loaned to us from the 3d Infantry Brigade," Lt. Col. Choeu Yeun said. "He is attached to the 3d and normally works in the field with them, but he is needed here. I am surprised that you did not know him."

In the past month rebel troops have moved within one to four miles of Kampot, capturing the city's main water supply and the country's only cement factory. They regularly shell the town with 75-mm. recoilless rifles and 81-mm. mortars.

Although government intelligence officers warned of an impending offensive as early as January, the Kampot garrison made no defense preparations. Over the past week the Cambodian high command sent reinforcements—and they sent Maj. Onderker.

"Protect this area immediately," Maj. Onderker said while the 81 rounds were falling in and around the city Monday morning. "Good, perfect," he said as a Cambodian

officer pointed on the map after accepting the American's proposal.

The day before rebel gunners shot down one of the two helicopter gunships stationed here, and the second one was recalled to Phnom Penh. Maj. Onderker arranged with the U.S. embassy on the morning of the attack that additional gunships would be sent to Kampot to support the infantry.

A member of the U.S. military attaché's staff in Phnom Penh, Onderker, is in Kampot officially to gather information. Chuck Bernard, known as Monsieur Jacques, is the other U.S. representative in town. He has approximately the same official duties as Onderker except that his area is civilian matters.

"Monsieur Jacques works with me," said Ker Sophay, director of political warfare. "He writes propaganda tracts with me. We have published, and distributed 8,000 pamphlets in the three weeks he has been here."

While junior Cambodian officers say Americans advise in the field around Phnom Penh,

it has never been confirmed. In Kampot, however, it is difficult to hide. Onderker was in and out of the command post, openly recommending military maneuvers. Sometimes he prefaced his proposals with "I suggest and the general also suggests that you immediately fire in this direction."

The Cambodians were obviously pleased with the American's help. "Maj. Onderker was very good with the 3d Brigade; he will be good with us," said Col. Choeu Yeun.

Changes were made quickly after Onderker's arrival. Another infantry brigade was called in to bolster the 2,000-man government garrison, and the top command was replaced within 24 hours. The city's defense perimeter was stabilized for the first time throughout the siege.

Villagers are still leaving the town — the population has dropped from 50,000 to less than 20,000 in a month. Though all private shops are closed, and mortars still land within the city, the city's small open-air market reopened Sunday with some fruit and fish offered for sale.

WASHINGTON POST

14 March 1974

Law Bars U.S. Involvement

Cambodia 'Adviser' Probed

Reuter

The State Department said yesterday it has asked the U.S. embassy in Phnom Penh for a full report on a Washington Post dispatch that said an American military adviser was working in the field with Cambodian combat troops.

The Washington Post identified the officer as Maj. Lawrence Ondecker, and said he was advising Cambodian officers in the government command post at Kampot, a coastal town 80 miles south of Phnom Penh.

Congress has passed a law banning direct U.S. military involvement in Indochina, and the newspaper report prompted an angry Senate demand

for an investigation.

The State Department noted that military personnel are required by law to maintain close liaison with Khmer officials to ensure safe delivery of U.S. military equipment.

"However, I do acknowledge that (delivery personnel) are not assigned as advisers and they are not supposed to function in a combat advisory role," department spokesman John King said.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee made preliminary inquiries during a nomination hearing for the ambassador-designate to Cambodia, John G. Dean, a career Foreign Service officer.

But a bipartisan group of nearly two dozen senators formally requested an Armed

Services Committee investigation, declaring in a statement that "covert and illegal war cannot be tolerated by the Congress."

Dean, until recently deputy chief of mission at the American embassy in Laos, told the Foreign Relations Committee that the State Department had asked the U.S. embassy in Phnom Penh for clarification of the report.

However, he defended maintaining Foreign Service and military officers in the field, saying they were "the eyes and ears" of the embassy in determining how American aid was being used.

The committee approved Dean's appointment as ambassador but not before he promised to provide a list of the

American personnel in Cambodia, who are limited by law to 500 men.

Sen. Alan Cranston (D-Calif.), a leader of last year's congressional campaign to end U.S. military involvement in Cambodia, said it apparently was not enough for Congress to pass laws.

"Apparently we underrated the administration's cunning and determination to go its own way regardless of the law... We must constantly monitor the implementation (of the law) and we must police and publicize every violation," he said in a Senate speech.

Sen. John Stennis (D-Miss.), chairman of the Armed Services Committee, said the panel would consider the request for investigation.

WASHINGTON POST

15 March 1974

U.S. Denies Advising in Cambodia

Reuter

A U.S. military attache in Cambodia has denied acting illegally as a combat adviser to Cambodian government troops, the State Department said yesterday, but congressional demands for an investigation of his activity increased.

State Department spokesman George Vest said the U.S. embassy in Phnom Penh had termed "unjustified" a Washington Post story that said Maj. Lawrence Ondecker had advised government troops at Kampot, Cambodia, in violation of U.S. laws barring military advisers from Indochina.

Vest said: "The embassy has assured us that the U.S. military personnel in Cambodia are fully instructed as to the legal restrictions on their activities and are complying with these restrictions and that the allegations in the story are not justified."

Vest did not respond to questions about exactly what was being disputed, saying only that the embassy reply is the official response.

Vest did not say the article, by Elizabeth Becker, a correspondent for both the Post and Newsweek Magazine, was inaccurate.

Post Foreign Editor Lee Lescage said the newspaper stands by the story.

There was angry reaction on Capitol Hill to the story and 41 senators have co-sponsored a resolution by Sen. Alan Cranston (D-Calif.) demanding an investigation of Ondecker's reported activity.

Becker quoted Ondecker as telling Cambodian officers under mortar attack at Kampot: "I want you to respond very quickly. If even one mortar falls in your zone, you must answer back with fire immediately."

The telegram from the embassy in Phnom Penh said Becker had a "rudimentary" speaking knowledge of French and may have misunderstood Ondecker's conversations with Cambodian officers.

"I made no suggestions nor in any way gave instructions or advice to the Khmer," the telegram quoted Ondecker as saying.

Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho) the co-author of the 1971 Cooper-Church amendment barring U.S. advisers from Indochina, disclosed that he had sent a letter to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.

If The Washington Post story is correct, the letter said, "this is a direct violation of the laws of the land."

Church said he had reminded Kissinger of his pledge to the Senate last September that the department would not seek to circumvent legal obstacles to the U.S. military presence in Indochina.

Church also called on Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger "to account fully and openly for this apparent violation as soon as possible."

NEW YORK TIMES

20 March 1974

Vietnam Again

The news from Southeast Asia is beginning to have a morbidly familiar ring. In an engagement Monday Vietnamese forces suffered their heaviest casualties since the signing of cease-fire fourteen months ago. In fierce fighting on the same day Cambodian insurgents captured a major city twenty miles from Phnom Penh.

In Washington the Defense Department is asking Congress for urgent new military aid to South Vietnam, and the American Ambassador in Saigon is warning that the "people of the world" will be exposed to "enormous dangers" if the United States fails to provide wholehearted support for President Nguyen Van Thieu. Those who dare to question the continuing United States military effort, says Ambassador Graham Martin, are only succumbing to the insidious influence of Communist North Vietnam.

There is scarcely a pretense any more that the Vietnam truce agreement has brought respite from war. Pentagon witnesses told a Congressional committee this week that, unless a quick \$474 million is sent off to Saigon, President Thieu's military operations would have to be sharply curtailed next month. And for the coming year, the Administration seeks \$2.4 billion for Vietnam aid, plus another \$463 million to support American military forces based in Southeast Asia. In the first year of so-called peace, the United States expense for weapons and ammunition in Vietnam was only 25 per cent below the level for corresponding programs in the heavy war year of 1972.

Neither North nor South Vietnam has shown any interest in implementing the elaborate and patently unwieldy political provisions of the Paris accords. If this comes as no surprise, what is ominous is the unstated assumption that the United States is committed to keeping the war going, on President Thieu's terms. Having successfully barred direct combat involvement in Southeast Asia, the Congress is entitled now to be wary of continued drift into war by proxy.

NEW YORK TIMES
9 March 1974

U.S. Envoy in Saigon Charges Times Article Was Inaccurate

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 8—Graham A. Martin, the United States Ambassador in South Vietnam, has complained to the State Department that an article in New York Times on continued American involvement in Vietnam "contains numerous inaccuracies and half-truths."

In a lengthy cablegram made available to The Times in Washington, Mr. Martin took strong issue with a survey article that was written by David K. Shipler of The Times Saigon bureau and published on Feb. 25.

Mr. Shipler wrote, in summary, that American military aid to the Saigon Government "continues to set the course of the war more than a year after the signing of the Paris peace agreements and the final withdrawal of American troops."

"Whether the United States is breaking the letter of the agreements could probably be argued either way," Mr. Shipler wrote. "But certainly the aid directly supports South Vietnamese violations and so breaks the spirit of the accords."

Hanoi Campaign Seen

In a preface to a paragraph-by-paragraph rebuttal of Mr. Shipler's article, Ambassador Martin said that Hanoi was planning an all-out campaign to persuade Congress to cut aid to Saigon and that efforts would be made "to bring influence to bear on selective susceptible but influential elements of American communications media."

As an example of his objections, Mr. Martin noted that Mr. Shipler had referred to Saigon's violations of the cease-

fire accord.

"This is a classic," Mr. Martin said. "Shipler categorically postulates 'South Vietnamese violations' without presenting a shred of evidence, and alleges American military aid 'directly supports' such violations which thereby 'breaks the spirit of the accords.'"

"It is quite true that to Hanoi the spirit of the accords was that the Americans would deliver South Vietnam bound hand and foot into their hands," the Ambassador said. "Fortunately, only a handful of Americans would agree with that interpretation of the spirit of the accords."

Mr. Martin acknowledged in his cablegram that he and Maj. Gen. John E. Murray, the embassy's defense attaché, had refused to meet with Mr. Shipler while he was preparing his article because "to do so would permit their own reputations for integrity to be used as a platform for promoting a cam-

paign to grossly deceive the American Congress and the American people."

"In summary, Mr. Martin said, 'the Shipler article was obviously not written to inform New York Times readers but to give a slanted impression that the United States and South Vietnam are grossly violating the cease-fire agreement.'"

"It deliberately omits or treats skeptically the flagrant Communist violations of the Paris accords, all of which have been pointed out repeatedly to Shipler and The New York Times Saigon Bureau by United States and South Vietnamese officials."

Mr. Martin invited Secretary of State Kissinger or Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger to release his cablegram to the Columbia School of Journalism to expose "propaganda under the guise of 'investigative reporting' rather than a responsible journalistic effort."

WASHINGTON POST
14 March 1974

Whose Ambassador?

MR. GRAHAM A. MARTIN, President Thieu of South Vietnam has a warm friend and a forceful and highly placed advocate—a fine ambassador, you might say. Indeed, Mr. Martin's recent attack on a New York Times report on American aid to Saigon—an 18-page attack which Mr. Martin asked the State Department to make public—could hardly have pleased President Thieu more. It mirrored precisely Mr. Thieu's own view that the fount of all criticism of his rule is Hanoi.

The catch is that Graham Martin is not the ambassador of South Vietnam to Washington. He is the American ambassador to Saigon. This would seem to be an elementary distinction but Mr. Martin, in his blindered devotion to President Thieu, has evidently lost sight of it. We have his devotion (and his low boiling point) to thank for the fact that he has come out from behind the wall of discretion, behind which professional diplomats ordinarily work, in order to challenge a reporter for the Times.

It is, first, outrageous that Mr. Martin should preface his challenge with the suggestion that press and congressional criticism of South Vietnam is being orchestrated by Hanoi. The charge is false—and mischievous. That an American career envoy in the year 1974, should be sniping in a cheap political way at the motives of Vietnam policy critics is a sad commentary on how little the old cold-war-oriented hands have learned from our Indochina experience. Moreover, it is an old and unworthy play for an official to disdain to talk with a reporter on grounds that the reporter is "biased," and then denounce him for alleged errors. In short, Mr. Martin is paying a heavy price for Mr. Thieu's affection.

Secondly, Mr. Martin's critique is a throwback to the bad old days of one-sided, self-serving, over-simplified

reporting on Vietnam and, as such, is altogether out of line with the more nuanced requirements of a policy that no longer needs to depend for its effectiveness on misleading the American people. We had thought, or hoped, the objective now was to help move the Vietnamese parties toward a real settlement. By the evidence of Mr. Martin, however, the policy is to supply President Thieu the resources and encouragement to let him sidestep the Paris accords and to keep pressing the war. For it is obvious that Mr. Thieu, seeing Mr. Martin's uncritical devotion to him, can have little incentive to heed whatever cautions the U.S. Government may simultaneously offer. We apparently have here a classic case study of how an ambassador loses influence with the government to which he is accredited.

As to the specifics of the aid program as discussed by the Times and Mr. Martin, we believe, as we have previously said, that Congress should itself go deeply into the whole program. The Times article charged that American military aid "continues to set the course of the war"; various American violations of the Geneva accords were alleged. Denying these allegations, Ambassador Martin responded that the course of the war is set by "the continuous and continuing Communist build-up" and by Saigon's response to "actual military attacks mounted by the other side." These are, we submit, differences of perception which the Congress ought to try to clarify before it votes further aid for South Vietnam. The administration is asking for \$1.45 billion in military aid in fiscal 1975—up from the \$829 million approved in 1974. Whatever total it finally approves, the Congress should be convinced that the money is being given in an amount and in a way designed to reinforce the Paris accords, not to undermine them.

NEW YORK TIMES
18 March 1974

Kennedy Complains to Kissinger On Criticism by Envoy in Saigon

WASHINGTON, March 17 (Reuters)—Senator Edward M. Kennedy has told Secretary of State Kissinger that a cablegram from the United States Ambassador in South Vietnam has raised the "worst kind of innuendo" about Congressional criticisms of American policy in Indochina.

Mr. Kennedy made his March 13 letter public today as he and other members of Congress critical of the continued United States involvement in Indochina stepped up the campaign to cut off military aid to South Vietnam. The Massachusetts Dem-

ocrat asked Mr. Kissinger to explain exactly what the United States was doing in Indochina with its continued military and economic aid to South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.

Mr. Kennedy's letter criticized a March 6 cablegram sent to the State Department by Graham A. Martin, the Ambassador to Saigon. The cablegram, which was published in part in the press earlier this month, said that Hanoi was trying to use "the remnants of the American 'peace movement' to bring influence to bear on selective susceptible, but influential

elements of American communications media and, particularly, on susceptible Congressional staffers."

"For him to suggest a tie," Mr. Kennedy wrote, "between alleged decisions in Hanoi and the views of members of Congress and their staffs about the course of American policy toward South Vietnam and Indochina is the worst kind of innuendo and regrettably ignores the many legitimate questions and concerns of the Congress and the American people over our commitments to the governments of Indochina and over the continuing level of our involvement in the political and military confron-

tations of the area."

A sizable portion of Mr. Graham's cablegram contained criticism of an article written from Saigon by David K. Shipler of The New York Times. That article, which was printed on Feb. 25, reported on United States military aid to the Saigon Government.

This said, the article said, "continues to set the course of the war fore than a year after the signing of the Paris peace agreements and the final withdrawal of American troops."

Mr. Martin, in his cablegram, submitted a paragraph-by-paragraph rebuttal of the article, which he said contained "numerous inaccuracies and half truths."

THE ECONOMIST MARCH 9, 1974

Thieu's hoping for oil, too

Saigon

It needs three things to go President Thieu's way if he is to pull the South Vietnamese economy round. One is that the North Vietnamese do not launch an attack. The second is that America continues with its current rate of aid. The third is that commodity prices level off. In these conditions the country might get through 1974 with a payments gap of £85m (or more than its own reserves), an inflation of 30-50 per cent, and a 10 per cent drop in real living standards. So even on the most optimistic assumptions South Vietnam's economic outlook is bleak.

The war years, plus the huge sums spent by the Americans, pumped the economy up like a balloon. They also warped it in a way that is only now really being felt. At the height of the American presence in the mid-1960s, the money spent by the half million GIs and others amounted to £170m-£210m annually. It created a range of service industries and jobs for staff on canteens and bases, prostitutes, bar girls, unofficial wives and so on. Out of a 19m population, 250,000 were employed directly by the Americans, and the South Vietnamese government amassed \$400m (£170m) in foreign exchange reserves. With the American withdrawal these services have evaporated. The government's own reserves have run

down to less than £40m. And the war and the lure of easy money have swollen the town populations. They are now 40 per cent of the total; yet South Vietnam has very few industries. So there is mass unemployment. Unofficial spending by the remaining 7,000 or so Americans will probably total only £35m this year. And on top of the withdrawal South Vietnam has been savaged by the rise in world commodity prices.

Imports last year amounted to £300m. This year they will double in cost, principally because of oil and fertilisers. For obvious reasons there are no oil refineries in the country. So, with some allowance for growth, the cost of imported petrol alone would soar from £35m to £85m. For the same reason there are no fertiliser plants either. But in most of the Mekong delta farmers have gone over to miracle rice as part of the much-trumpeted green revolution, and miracle rice needs lots of fertiliser.

Fertiliser imports have therefore been eating up one-eighth of the country's import bill. Now fertiliser prices have doubled in six months. Besides the foreign exchange bill, farmers themselves have been badly hit. Some have been cutting back crop plantings. This could threaten South Vietnam's hopes of becoming self-sufficient in rice this year and even exporting 50,000 tons. Another

offensive by the North Vietnamese, of course, would be even more damaging.

Exports have been rising—to £10m in 1972, £26m in 1973 and maybe £43m this year—but not enough to dent the import bill significantly. The yawning trade gap would not matter if the Americans were prepared to foot the bill. But in the past three years American economic aid has remained constant in dollar terms. In real terms this means a fall of 30 per cent this year alone. Last year the rate of inflation was 65 per cent. Yet the wages of important groups like the army and the civil service rose only 20 per cent.

This year South Vietnam is expected to get between £140m and £160m of the £190m that Congress has allowed President Nixon for Indochina reconstruction aid. In addition something between £64m and £110m should be available in PL 480 commodity aid. Even adding £43m which might spill over from military aid, as well as loans from Japan and France, this still leaves a nasty payments gap. There is virtually no money available for development.

Against this there is the country's main hope for the future—oil. The oilmen are well ahead with their programmes. Prospects are good and off-shore drilling could start in the second half of this year. Eventually the discovery of oil could get South Vietnam off the hook completely, but even the oil search itself will improve confidence.

In the meantime, all Saigon can do is keep its fingers crossed that world commodity prices do not rise too rapidly. But as a good half of the budget goes on defence, until President Thieu can demobilise some of his army of 1m, he will have an inflationary situation on his hands—and disaffection too as belts are tightened.

Western Hemisphere

BALTIMORE SUN
8 March 1974
In Latin America

The Decline of Christian Democracy

By RICHARD O'MARA

Santiago.

There is some argument over whether the corpse of Latin American Christian Democracy is interred in Caracas, Venezuela, or here in the New Chile. A few souls still believe that the "hope of the future," as Christian Democracy was called in Latin America only a decade ago, is still alive. If it is, it is not kicking.

In Venezuela last December 9, the presidential candidate for the ruling Christian Democratic party, Lorenzo Fernandez, was soundly trounced by Carlos Andres Perez, of *Accion Democratica*. In an interview two days before the election, Mr. Perez made two predictions: that he would win the presidency, and that Christian Democracy "was through as a force in Venezuela and Latin America."

He won, and it looks like it is. Christian Democracy emerged in Europe as a democratic compromise between the conflicting totalitarianisms of communism and fascism. Those forces have clashed as frequently, though not as fiercely, in Latin America. In 1947 the trumpet was blown for Christian Democracy in Uruguay. It was heard in Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, Peru, Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, and it even reached as far as Mexico.

Even in Paraguay, ever squashed under the heel of Gen. Alfredo Stroessner, hope flickered and a nucleus of Christian Democrats took form. Less successful and viable Christian Democratic parties in some countries took heart in the success of their coreligionaries in others.

Thus, Christian Democracy was probably one of the most positive forces ever to thrive in Latin America. It bridged the disparate cultures of the various countries

as no other force did, except perhaps Catholicism. But then, it was a political faith that sort of grew out of the spiritual one.

Christian Democracy was most successful in Venezuela and Chile, where it won the governments. In Venezuela, Rafael Caldera won the presidency in 1958. He will keep it until March when he must turn it over to Mr. Perez.

Eduardo Frei won the presidency of Chile in 1964, and as the first of his kind to reach the top he set the torch burning its brightest. Mr. Frei was a sincere reformer, intelligent, honest and determined to carry out policies aimed at distributing the wealth of Chile more equitably. In much he succeeded, and in much he failed. And in doing what he did he stimulated the appetites of many dispossessed Chileans for more.

Thus, we had Salvador Allende, the coup d'etat of last September 11, and now Gen. Agostino Pinochet. There are those who fear that General Pinochet and the extremists of the right who have his ear, will push the pendulum all the way back to pre-Frei days.

It might be said that Christian Democracy got tired in Venezuela, got cautious in Chile and got crushed everywhere else.

It was not clear to most political experts that the Christian Democratic party of Venezuela, COPEI, had ceased to be a party of the people by the end of Mr. Caldera's term. In his earlier years Mr. Caldera had populist pretensions. The astounding defeat of his hand-picked candidate and would-be successor, Mr. Fernandez, taught the experts a lesson, that COPEI had become little more than a smooth, slick machine, a party that seemed to have lost its heart.

It is said that in the months preceding the overthrow and death of Socialist President Salvador Allende, Eduardo Frei had become a *golpista*, that is someone agitating for a coup. That has not been proved, but it was clear that prior to the coup Mr. Frei had aligned himself with the right wing of the Christian Democratic party, which had come to control it mainly through the person of Patricio Aylwin, the party's president.

Mr. Aylwin's last significant political act was to refuse to even talk with President Allende and the *Union Popular* government's representatives. Some believe that was the strategy that isolated the Allende government and made the coup a certainty. Mr. Frei, it is believed, concurred with that policy, and in doing so one can see how far he had traveled since he stood out as Christian Democracy's shining apostle.

Mr. Frei, Mr. Aylwin and Mr. Caldera are veterans of Christian Democracy's struggle to succeed in Latin America. They have been personally successful, but in their success they have brought about a decline in the fortunes of the movement, or at least separated it from its earlier ideals. In other countries than Chile and Venezuela, Christian Democracy was smashed from the outside: smothered in Argentina and crushed in Brazil. In Bolivia, the party leader, Benjamin Miguel, is in prison.

Despite its general decline, Christian Democracy is not without outstanding figures. Among these are Radomiro Tomic, of Chile, and Andre Franco Montoro, of Brazil.

Mr. Tomic was the Christian

Democratic candidate for president against Salvador Allende in 1970; he lost and because he lost his esteem ebbed within the party and control passed to Mr. Aylwin. Now, because of Mr. Aylwin's complicity in the coup—indirect, to be sure—Mr. Tomic has been rehabilitated in the eyes of many Christian Democrats.

It is significant, and indicative of the breadth and vision of the two men, that Mr. Aylwin blamed Dr. Allende exclusively for what befell him. Mr. Tomic spread the blame around, described the coup as a result of the failure of all to make democracy work.

Obviously, Chile is not a comfortable place for Mr. Tomic these days, and for that reason he is sojourning in Texas. Brazil is also not a comfortable place for Mr. Montoro.

Mr. Montoro is a Christian Democrat in Brazil. He is also a senator, which does not mean much since the congress there is only a collection of puppets controlled by the military government. Still, Mr. Montoro manages to be about as an effective critic of the military dictatorship as anyone could be while living in that country.

Tristao de Athayde is one of Brazil's most astute political commentators. Recently, writing in *Journal do Brasil*, he asked himself one of those rhetorical questions for which the writer professes to have no answer. The question was, is "Christian Democracy in a comatose state or a changing state?"

No one can be sure, but one thing is certain: if it is changing it is changing into something not as exciting as it once was.

WASHINGTON POST

11 March 1974

Antiwar Groups Find New Cause

American Groups Hit Chile

By Terri Shaw

Washington Post Staff Writer

Disturbed by reports of continuing political repression in Chile, many of the American groups that sparked the movement against the Vietnam war have begun to work together again to oppose the military junta that overthrew Chilean President Salvador Allende.

For varying reasons, young radicals, church groups concerned about social justice and some trade unions have directed their attention to Chile where the right-wing junta has done away with most democratic institutions.

Several of these organizations have sent delegations to Chile to investigate reports of the torture of political prisoners and other violations of human rights. Others have been lobbying in Washington to gain help for refugees from the new government and to urge a cutoff of U.S. aid to Chile.

The existence of this new coalition became apparent at a conference on Chile held recently on Capitol Hill under the sponsorship of several legislators.

The conference, financed by the Fund for New Priorities for America, was intended to be a forum for all points of view about the new Chilean government and its relationship to the United States.

However, all U.S. govern-

ment officials who had been invited to attend declined, and Chilean Ambassador Walter Heitmann canceled out at the last moment.

Several people involved in organizing the meeting said they had made a special effort to convince State Department officials to attend, but were told that the conference would be "biased against the Chilean junta."

"By not participating they left the conference even more unbalanced," one congressional source said. The administration's failure to participate "was seen by many people on the Hill as a slap by the Executive Branch at Congress trying to deal with a foreign policy issue," he added.

William Meyers, president of the Fund for New Priorities which has sponsored about 20 similar meetings on other topics, said it was the first time the administration had boycotted one.

About 300 listeners, many of them young, packed a large hearing room in the New Senate Office Building to hear grim reports of torture, hunger and repression from recent visitors to Chile, academic specialists on Latin America and Chilean exiles. Meyer warned the partisan audience several times against loudly demonstrating its opposition to the new Chilean government.

Paul Shumard, a professor of political science at Prince-

ton University remarked on the emergence of an "alliance of church groups, independent public interest groups and universities" against the Chilean junta.

"It really has been a national movement," he added, pointing out that when U.S. Marines invaded the Dominican Republic in 1965 "there was hardly a murmur from the American people."

Laurence Birns, of the New School for Social Research in New York City, predicted that American corporations who invested in Chile under the junta "will be tirelessly publicized" and perhaps face the same kind of demonstrations as those mounted against companies manufacturing napalm during the Vietnam war.

One of the major goals of opponents of the junta is a suspension of foreign assistance to the new Chilean government.

An ally in this effort and one of the sponsors of the conference is Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.).

Sen. Kennedy said that several international investigations "and the innumerable personal accounts that have been submitted to my office disclose the grossest violations of human rights" in Chile.

Kennedy said that despite a provision in the new foreign aid law saying that Chile should get no more aid until human rights are protected,

the administration has requested new military aid for the junta and is backing new loans for Chile in the international development banks.

Donald Anderson, assistant vice president for Latin America for First National City Bank of New York, and one of the few at the meeting who was not critical of the junta, pointed out that Chile will need large credits from the international lending agencies to get its economy moving again.

An indication of the widespread concern about violations of human rights in Chile came in a statement issued after the Capitol Hill conference by a group of intellectuals, including Roger Baldwin of the International League for the Rights of Man, and historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr.

The statement criticized the Allende government for "creating the situation which led to the military action of Sept. 11." But it also called on the junta "to move quickly to restore democratic rights and institutions."

The signers of the statement, identified as members of the Inter-American Association for Democracy and Freedom, urged the U.S. government to provide aid to the junta; but also "to use its good offices in all legitimate ways to urge on the junta the urgent need to restore functioning democratic processes."

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

15 March 1974

Chilean regime moves to turn off all opposition politics

By James Nelson Goodsell
Latin America correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Santiago, Chile

Chile has long been the most politicized nation in the southern hemisphere. In fact, politics used to be a way of life here.

But this is now a thing of the past.

Six months after the overthrow of Salvador Allende Gossens' Marxist government, Chile's military leaders have, in effect, declared themselves the one political force of consequence in the nation.

They expect — and will brook — no competition.

Normal political activity is virtually in suspension. Not only have the Marxist parties been proscribed, but the non-Marxist parties, including those that supported the military takeover, have also been put into a form of limbo.

Hard news for Frei

This is particularly galling to the Christian Democrats, and most especially to their world-renowned leader, Eduardo Frei Montalva, whose Reformist Party has for a decade been Chile's largest single political force.

They had expected to play a major role in the military government that seized power in the wake of Dr. Allende's overthrow and thus to be in on the ground floor for an eventual return to traditional political patterns in what they hoped would be the not-too-distant future.

But they have been sadly disappointed. Individual Christian Democrats are serving in the government, but the party itself has been shunted aside and warned not to become active.

La Prensa closed down

The Christian Democrats, angry over the situation, several weeks ago

sent a letter to the military junta headed by Army Gen. Augusto Pinochet Ugarte expressing their displeasure — an action, it is understood here, that incensed the military commanders.

In the wake of that incident, the Christian Democrats closed down La Prensa, the newspaper that had become the party's mouthpiece in Santiago, indicating that conditions here did not permit the paper to operate in freedom. La Prensa was known to be having financial difficulties, but it would probably have been kept alive if it were not for the military-imposed press censorship that has cut Santiago's 13 dailies down to 5.

The military, for its part, in evolving its own political philosophy, is clearly more and more in disagreement with the Christian Democrats, blaming them for much of the difficulty now facing this

NEW YORK TIMES
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A Sad Double Standard

By Tom Wicker

Two items from The New York Times:

March 8, 1974: "Secretary of State Kissinger told a Senate committee today that he would recommend a veto of the Nixon Administration's own trade bill if Congress refused to grant trade concessions to the Soviet Union because of its restrictions on the free emigration of Jews and others."

Feb. 28, 1974: "[A high United States official] pointed out that the Central Intelligence Agency had rejected an offer by the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation of \$1 million in September, 1970, to be spent in Chile to defeat the Socialist candidate for the presidency, Salvador Allende Gossens. The offer was made to Richard M. Helms, who was then the Director of Central Intelligence,

now seems certain—murdered Mr. Allende.

There are numerous evidences that the officers who ordered the bloody coup and the later execution of what appears to have been thousands of Chileans were encouraged in their planning by American supporters, both official and unofficial. Nor did the Nixon Administration and its embassy officials in Santiago distinguish themselves in saving the lives of refugees, including some Americans.

The Chilean story is only gradually coming to light, but what is known is in sad contrast to Mr. Kissinger's position on Soviet emigration policies. He said he regards détente as of such overriding importance that the United States must not endanger it by trying to influence internal Soviet policies.

On the other hand, in pursuit of what it conceived to be the national interest, the Nixon Administration appears to have been a considerable influence in the opposition to, and overthrow of, the Allende Government. Before that, of course, various American Governments had had a hand in numerous interventions (for example, the overthrow of Guatemala's elected left-wing Government in the nineteen-fifties).

This reflects a double standard if ever there was one. It is a double standard in the sense that American interests (as perceived by the Administration in power) may require intervention in one country's internal affairs but forbid it in another. It is an even more deplorable double standard in that it seems to permit intervention for certain selfish political or economic purposes but not for the purpose of upholding human rights.

This is not necessarily to argue that Mr. Kissinger is altogether wrong on the Soviet emigration question; there is in fact much to support his position. Anyway, to take a stand for human rights in the Soviet Union might seem a bit ludicrous, since the Administration has such strong ties to Greece, the Chilean junta, Spain, Portugal, South Vietnam, South Korea, the Philippines and other strong-arm governments.

The members of Congress who are demanding Soviet concessions on emigration, moreover, have their own double standard; they are not so vocal about Chilean refugees, of whom only a handful have been admitted to this country, or about human rights in the numerous other repressive governments to which they annually vote military and other forms of aid. The Jewish emigration question, after all, is of interest to many of them only for obvious domestic political reasons.

Under the auspices of the Fund for New Priorities, some of the same members of Congress did take part the other day in public hearings on the situation in Chile. That would be an excellent place for them to show a more general concern for human rights—as well as for the established American double standard toward those rights.

nation.

A document prepared under military guidance and published in the Santiago newspaper El Mercurio on the eve of the six-month anniversary of the Allende ouster outlines military thinking on the question.

Arguing that "the long period of decadence" which Chile has undergone can be blamed on party politics and sectarian governments "whose aims were . . . to increase their electoral base . . . and not in the common good," the document specifically singles out the Christian Democrats, lumping them together with the Marxist parties that supported Dr. Allende.

'International' ties cited

It even goes so far as to say that Christian Democratic philosophy is of foreign origin. "Marxism and Christian democracy — were 'international' in many and important aspects," it states.

In working out a new concept of government, the document indicates the military is interested in something "not influenced by the concepts and attitudes that have brought us to decadence and disintegration."

There is no doubt that the military includes the Christian Democrats in this along with the Communists, Socialists, and other leftist parties that worked with Dr. Allende.

In effect, what the military is saying, according to a source close to the junta, is simply this: The political ideas supported by more than two thirds of the Chilean electorate in recent elections are to be discarded.

Trend long recognized

There never was any doubt that this was to be the fate of Dr. Allende's own Socialist Party and its close collaborator, the Communist Party, which together represented a good third of the electorate.

But now it is clear that this includes also the Christian Democrats, whose political base is another third of the national electorate.

This is bound to leave a major political vacuum — but such concerns do not seem to worry the military. The military leaders are convinced of the rightness of their cause and they indicate they have the patience and muscle to sit out any opposition that the policy encounters. Moreover, the military displays a determination to take the program to the people and win them over.

Whether such an effort will be successful remains to be seen. But the military certainly is not going to allow any organized political opposition in the effort.

IN THE NATION

"The Chilean story is . . . in sad contrast to Mr. Kissinger's position on Soviet emigration policies."

by the agency's former director, John A. McCone, who had become an I.T.T. board member."

There is no particular connection between these two items—except that there is now an intensive effort in Congress to deny most-favored-nation trading status to the Soviet Union if it continues to restrict the emigration of Jews; and that there was in 1970, and throughout his presidency, an intense effort by I.T.T. and others to prevent or destroy Mr. Allende's Government in Chile. But the Nixon Administration that Mr. Kissinger represented throughout the period did not threaten or disapprove the latter effort; quite the contrary.

The C.I.A. did turn down the I.T.T. money (although nothing seems to have been done about the scandalous attempt by a former C.I.A. director to bribe the agency, with private money, to undertake interference in the internal politics of another country). But the Nixon Administration restricted that Government's ability to get foreign credit and cut off foreign aid to it, continuing only to supply arms and training to the Chilean military.

Thus, it was troops trained by the United States and armed with American weapons who overthrew the Allende Government last fall and—as